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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-New York Procedure for Commitment of Prisoners
Who Become Mentally 11 While Serving Sentence Violates the Equal Pro-

tection Clause.-In 1931 Roy Schuster was convicted of the second degree
murder of his wife, and was sentenced to from twenty-five years to life imprisonment. 1 He began serving his sentence in Sing-Sing Prison, but was transferred to Clinton State Prison in 1935. While at Clinton, Schuster was a
model prisoner and at one time received a letter from the New York State
Board of Higher Education commending him for his work there. In 1941, he
became convinced of corruption in the administration of the prison. In that
year and largely because of this belief, Schuster was transferred from Clinton
to Dannemora State Hospital for the Criminally Insane pursuant to section 383
of the New York Correction Law.2 After three unsuccessful petitions to the
New York courts for habeas corpus, 3 Schuster was finally given a hearing in
1963 and found insane. 4 He then petitioned the United States District Court
for the Northern District of New York for habeas corpus, alleging that he was
1. At the trial, Schuster's defense was based on the contention that he was in a state
of panic at the time of the shooting and was not aware of what happened. To refute this
defense, the state introduced expert testimony to show that Schuster was not, at that time,
suffering from a mental disease or defect. United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d
1071, 1074 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 81 (1969).
2. N.Y. Correc. Law § 383 then read: "Whenever the physician or the psychiatrist of any
one of the state prisons . . . shall certify to the warden or superintendent thereof, that a
male prisoner confined therein and sentenced or committed thereto for a felony, is, in his
opinion insane, such warden or superintendent shall cause such prisoner to be transferred
to the Dannemora state hospital and delivered to the medical superintendent thereof. Such
superintendent shall receive the prisoner into such hospital, and retain him there until legally
discharged. . . . At the time of such transfer, there shall be transmitted to the superintendent of such hospital the original certificate of conviction and the certificate of insanity
executed by the physician or psychiatrist, which shall be filed in the office of such superintendent who shall file a notice of such transfer in the office of the department of correction."
Law of March 28, 1939, ch. 136, § 1, [1939] N.Y. Laws 167 (repealed 1962).
Schuster was transferred to Dannemora upon the recommendation of the one physician
at Clinton, after one conversation. The doctor's summary of Schuster's mental health was
that "'[hie was circumstantial in his conversation, very talkative, complained bitterly. He
was paranoid and suspicious.... This man was reported for writing letters regarding cowardly
attacks made against him by the personnel and requested that something be done about iL
In his letters he has shown the paranoid idea that members of the personnel are against
him.'" United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1075 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
90 S. Ct. 81 (1969).
3. Schuster petitioned for habeas corpus in 1950, 1960 and 1962. New York, however,
did not recognize the right of an insane convict to challenge his confinement by this
method until 1961. People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E2d 725, 215
N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961).
4. People ex reI. Schuster v. Herold, 22 App. Div. 2d 762, 253 N.Y.S.2d 534 (3d Dep't
1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 968, 207 N.E.2d 527, 259 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1965).
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sane and that the procedure by which he had been transferred to Dannemora
was unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the petition.5 On appeal, the
court of appeals remanded for a hearing to determine whether Schuster's
original transfer to Dannemora was corruptly motivated. The district court
found Schuster insane, and again dismissed the petition. On appeal from the
dismissal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the differences
between the procedures established for the involuntary commitment of the
civilly and criminally insane violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6 United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 81 (1969).
New York operates two state hospitals for prisoners who become mentally
ill while serving their sentences. 7 Originally, transfer to either of these institutions was on a purely administrative basis. 8 Thus, based solely on a finding by
the prison physician that Schuster was insane, the warden had him examined
and then ordered him committed to Dannemora. In the same year, an involuntarily committed civil patient would have been entitled to examination by
two doctors, notice of the commitment proceeding, a hearing before a judge,
and a court order of commitment.10
In 1943, section 408 was added to allow transfer to Matteawan only after
a hearing with proper notice." In 1962, such safeguards were also given to
prisoners transferred to Dannemora. 1 2 Thus, at the present time, a prisoner
cannot be transferred to either Dannemora or Matteawan without certification
by two physicians, notice to the prisoner and a family member or friend, and
a judicial order of commitment. Further, if any person entitled to notice requests a hearing, one must be held within five days. Witnesses may be presented, the prisoner examined, and the judge must render a decision in
writing. 13
5. United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1077 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
90 S. Ct. 81 (1969).

6. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In relevant part, it provides: "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
7. They are Matteawan and Dannemora. See generally Ass'n of the 13. of the City of
N.Y., Special Comm. on the Study of Commitment Procedures and the Law Relating to
Incompetents, Mental Illness, Due Process and the Criminal Defendant, Appendix A (1968).
8. See note 2 supra.
9. It is unclear from the record whether the committing doctor had any psychiatric
training. 410 F.2d at 1075.
10. Law of April 24, 1933, ch. 395, § 10, [1933] N.Y. Laws 930, as amended, N.Y.
Mental Hygiene Law § 76 (Supp. 1969).
11. Law of April 8, 1943, ch. 382, § 1, [1943) N.Y. Laws 901, as amended, N.Y. Correc.
Law § 408 (1968).
12. Law of April 9, 1962, ch. 393, § 1, [1962] N.Y. Laws 2210, as amended, N.Y. Correc.
Law § 383 (1968).
13. See N.Y. Correc. Law §§ 383 (transfer to Dannemora), 408 (transfer to Matteawan)
(1968).
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There has been a corresponding growth in the procedural rights of the involuntarily committed civil patient. 14 Today, he is entitled to the rights he
had in 1941, plus judicial review after the first sixty days of commitment, at
the end of the first year, and periodically every two years thereafter. He may
demand de novo review by a jury and is entitled to use the services of the
1
Mental Health Information Service.
By 1969, then, the rights of both the civilly and criminally mentally ill had
been greatly expanded. Yet the rights of the involuntarily committed civil
patient are far more extensive than those of the involuntarily committed prisoner. As the Schuster court noted:
Thus, it is true, as a sage commented, that time is what we want most but use worst,
for there remains today almost as wide a chasm between the roads traveled by nonprisoners and prisoners as existed in 1941 when Schuster first arrived at Dannemora.10
The court rejected the State's argument that Schuster's transfer was a
mere administrative matter, not open to judicial review.Y7 It noted that because of his transfer Schuster had been deprived of significant rights,18 and
the case was thus reviewable under Johnson v. Avery,'0 .'hich held that:
[D]iscipline and administration of state detention facilities are state functions. They
are subject to federal authority only where paramount federal constitutional or statutory rights supervene. It is clear, however, that in instances where state regulations
applicable to inmates
of prison facilities conflict with such rights, the regulations may
20
be invalidated.
Among the rights which Schuster had been unable to exercise were the right
to attack his conviction via coram nobis,2 and, until 1962, the right to bring
a petition for habeas corpus.22 The court was also disturbed by the fact that,
had he not been transferred to Dannemora, Schuster would have been eligible
14. In 1965, New York revised many of its laws relating to the involuntary commitment of mental patients. This was done largely in response to a study by the New York
City Bar Association. See Ass'n of the B. of the City of N.Y., Special Comm. to Study
Commitment Procedures, Mental Illness and Due Process (1962).
15. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law §§ 72-74, 88 (Supp. 1969).
16. 410 F.2d at 1083.
17. The state relied on People ex rel. Sacconanno v. Shaw, 4 App. Div. 2d 817, 164
N.YS.2d 750 (3d Dep't 1957) and Urban v. Settle, 298 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1962). Both
of these cases held that transfer from a prison to a mental institution was an administrative
matter not open to judicial scrutiny.
18. The court noted that confinement at Dannemora "significantly increased the restraints
upon him, exposed him to extraordinary hardships, and caused him to suffer indignities,
frustrations and dangers, both physical and psychological, he would not be required to
endure in a typical prison setting." 410 F.2d at 1078.
19. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
20. Id. at 486.
21. The court of appeals held in People v. Booth, 17 N.Y2d 681, 216 N.E2d 615, 269

N.Y.S.2d 457 (1966) that a prisoner may not attack his conviction via coram nobis until
he has been declared sane.
22.

See note 3 supra.
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for parole in 1948, some 21 years ago. 23 In view of what the court called "the
substantial deprivations, hardships and indignities such a move may produce,"'24 it found that the transfer was far more than an administrative matter,
and was, therefore, reviewable.
In the past decade, many courts have taken cognizance of these procedural
differences and their constitutional implications. 25 Thus, in the 1961 decision
in United States ex rel. Carroll v. McNeill,26 the Second Circuit struck down
section 412 of the New York Correction Law. 27 Carroll had been convicted
of robbery in 1934, and served a four year sentence. In 1949, Carroll was
civilly committed to Pilgrim State Hospital. He later escaped, criminally assaulting a guard in the process. Upon recapture, he was returned to Pilgrim
and immediately transferred to Matteawan pursuant to section 412, which
allowed transfer of an ex-convict who had been civilly committed after
serving his sentence if he still manifested criminal tendencies. The transfer was
to be without a hearing, solely upon the written order of the Commissioner
of Mental Hygiene. At the same time, however, a civilly committed patient
who manifested dangerous tendencies but who had no criminal record was entitled to a hearing before transfer.28 The court found this difference so arbitrary as to be constitutionally defective as a violation
of both the due process
29
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
23. The New York Parole Board has a policy of not paroling prisoners directly from
Dannemora. 410 F.2d at 1080. In light of Schuster's excellent behavior prior to the transfer, it seems likely be would have received parole.
24. 410 F.2d at 1080. The court then went on to state that "judicial scrutiny is necessary
to ensure that the procedures preceding the transfer adequately safeguard the fundamental
rights of the prisoner." Id.
25. The courts have relied mainly on due process and equal protection grounds. However, in People ex rel. Cirrone v. Hoffmann, 255 App. Div. 404, 8 N.Y.S.2d 83 (3d Dep't
1938), the court relied in part on the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
as grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus where a prisoner was transferred from a
prison to Napanoch Institution for Male Defective Delinquents.
26. 294 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1961), appeal dismissed as moot, 369 U.S. 149 (1962).
27. N.Y. Correc. Law § 412 then read: "The commisioner [sic] of mental hygiene
may, by order in writing, transfer to the Matteawan state hospital any insane inmate of
another state hospital, who was held under any other than a civil process, committed
thereto upon the order of a court of criminal jurisdiction or of a judge or justice of such
court; or any patient who has previously been sentenced to a term of imprisonment in any
correctional institution, and who still manifests criminal tendencies, or any such patient
who has previously been an inmate of the Matteawan state hospital." Law of April 8,
1959, ch. 264, § 1, [1959] N.Y. Laws 1016 (repealed 1965).
28. See Law of April 7, 1944, ch. 666, § 40, [1944] N.Y. Laws 1434 (repealed 1963).
29. The court noted: "A state may, of course, in the interests of effectuating its valid
governmental policies, make reasonable classifications among its citizens whereby those in
one class may be treated differently from those in another. . . . However, in so doing, a
state must guard against classifications which are so arbitrary that they are repugnant to
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 294 F.2d at 121-22 (citations
omitted).
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In People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston,0 also decided in 1961, the New York
Court of Appeals for the first time allowed the use of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of a transfer from a prison to a mental institution.al Brown
was given an indeterminate sentence of from one day to life and sent to Attica

State Prison. He was later transferred to Dannemora and thereafter brought
a petition for habeas corpus alleging that he was sane and that the transfer

was illegal. The appellate division did not discuss the issue of sanity, but
denied the writ on the ground that the place of confinement was an administrative matter, not subject to judicial review. 32 The court of appeals rejected
this position, noting that while a prisoner ordinarily cannot challenge his

place of confinement by a writ of habeas corpus, transfer from a regular
prison to a facility for the mentally ill presented different problems. The court
said: "we do not feel that the courts should sanction, without question, removals, in cases of alleged insane prisoners, which can conceivably be uncontrolled and arbitrary."3 3 Noting that there was a difference between confinement in a prison and confinement in a mental institution "with deranged
persons who are liable to harm and/or adversely affect him," 34 the court
continued,

[I]t seems quite obvious that any further restraint in excess of that permitted by the
judgment or constitutional guarantees should be subject to inquiry. An individual,
once validly convicted and placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction . . is not to be divested of all rights and unalterably abandoned and forgotten by the remainder of society.35

In 1966, the Supreme Court recognized that classifications between criminals
and non-criminals for purposes of determining commitment procedures are
unconstitutional. In the landmark case of Baxstrom v. Herold,3 0 a unanimous
Court struck down section 384 of the New York Correction Law37 which

30. 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E2d 725, 215 N.YS.2d 44 (1961).
31. Prior to this decision, the courts had refused to entertain a habeas corpus proceeding
in such cases, holding that a prisoner could do so only after he had been declared scane by
the Dannemora authorities.
32. 11 App. Div. 2d 819, 203 N.YS.2d 353 (3d Dep't 1960), rev'd, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174
N.E.2d 725, 215 N.YS.2d 44 (1961).
33. 9 N.Y.2d at 484, 174 N.E2d at 726, 215 N.YS.2d at 45.
34. Id. at 485, 174 N.E2d at 726, 215 N.YS.2d at 45.
35. Id. at 485, 174 N.E.2d at 726, 215 N.YS.2d at 45-46. Thus, it appears that the
New York courts have also rejected the proposition that transfer to a state hospital for
the criminally insane is not subject to judicial review.
36. 383 US. 107 (1966).
37. N.Y. Correc. Law § 384 then read in part: "Within thirty days prior to the expiration of the term of a prisoner confined in the Dannemora state hospital, when in the
opinion of the director such prisoner continues mentally ill, the director shall make application for his commitment. Application for commitment shall be made to a court of record
or judge thereof . .. . The application shall be made by a petition accompanied by the
certificate of two examining physicians certifying to the defendant's need for institutional
care and treatment. Three days notice of the application, together with a copy of the
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allowed a prisoner transferred to Dannemora during his sentence pursuant to
section 383 to be civilly committed to Dannemora when his sentence expired.
In Baxstrom, the Director of Dannemora filed a petition in the Surrogate's
Court requesting that the prisoner be civilly committed to Dannemora. A
hearing was then held, and two physicians testified that Baxstrom was mentally ill and in need of hospitalization. The Surrogate signed an order committing him to the care of the Department of Mental Hygiene.38 Thus, although
he was officially under the care of the civil Department of Mental Hygiene,
Baxstrom was in fact incarcerated in a facility run by the Department of
Correction. The Supreme Court held that this procedure violated the equal
protection clause, as any civilly committed person other than a sentence-expired
prisoner was entitled to a jury trial and a judicial determination that he was
dangerously mentally ill before he could be transferred to a facility run by
the Department of Correction."0 In so holding, the Court said:
Classification of mentally ill persons as either insane or dangerously insane of course
may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determining the type of custodial or
medical care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever
in the context of the
4o
opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at all.
This trend has been followed by the New York courts, which have narrowed
the gap between the civilly and criminally committed in several areas. 41 In
the leading case of People v. Lally,42 the defendant pleaded not guilty by
reason of insanity and was acquitted. He was then committed to the care of
the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, who had him sent to Matteawan purpetition, shall be served upon the prisoner and upon his nearest relative or, if none, upon
any known friend within the state.
"If there is no demand for a hearing, the court to which application is made may, If
satisfied that the prisoner is in need of institutional care and treatment immediately issue
an order for the commitment of the prisoner to the custody of the commissioner of mental
hygiene ....
"If a hearing is demanded, the court shall, or it may upon its own motion, issue an order
directing a hearing upon the application at a time not more than five days from the date
of such order." See Law of June 28, 1965, ch. 540, § 4, [1965] N.Y. Laws 1458 (repealed
1966).
38. The Surrogate and Baxstrom's family had no objection to Baxstrom's transfer to a
civil state mental hospital, but the Department of Mental Hygiene had already, pro forma,
decided that Baxstrom was not suitable for a civil hospital. 383 U.S. at 108-09.
39.

Id. at 115.

40. Id. at 111.
41. See People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 292, 248 N.E.2d 17, 300 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1969) (a convicted addict is entitled to a separate hearing on the question of addiction before belng
involuntarily committed for treatment); People v. Bailey, 21 N.Y.2d 588, 237 N.E.2d 205,
289 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1968) (a convicted sex offender is entitled to a separate bearing on the
question of mental illness before being sentenced to an indefinite term) ; People ex rel. Goldfinger v. Johnston, 53 Misc. 2d 949, 280 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (a youth transferred
from a correctional school to a home for defective delinquents is entitled to a bearing).
42. 19 N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966).
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suant to section 454 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3 That statute allows
the judge in any proceeding in which the defendant is acquitted by reason
of insanity to commit him to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental
Hygiene who places the person in an appropriate facility. Thereafter, the
defendant can be released only upon application of the Commissioner to the
committing court or upon application of the defendant supported by a statement of the Commissioner, a court then ordering a hearing and the judge
determining whether to release, conditionally release or recommit the defendant.
The court of appeals found this section constitutional only by reading into it
the requirement that all the guarantees of sections 7444 and 8545 of the Mental
Hygiene Law, applicable in civil commitment cases, be observed. The court did
this to "provide defendant with protection equal to that of other persons
under the New York State statutes" 46 and "[t]o47comply with the spirit if not
the express language of the Baxstrorn decision.1
In the face of these decisions, the district court in Schuster tried to distinguish Baxstrom on the ground that in the latter case, the prisoner was
nearing the end of his sentence when he was committed and therefore should
be entitled to the same safeguards as a civilly committed person. On the
other hand, Schuster was serving an indeterminate sentence and was still a
prisoner at the time of his transfer to Dannemora. 48 The Second Circuit rejected this distinction. It felt that Baxstrom stood for the broader proposition
that "a finding of dangerous or criminal behavior does not obviate the necessity for a separate and adequate determination of commitability." 49
In light of the recent decisions applying the .Baxslron doctrine,r ° the court
of appeals would seem to be correct in this regard. As the District of Columbia
Circuit noted:
43. See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 454 (1958), as amended, N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 454
(Supp. 1969).
44. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 74 (1965), as amended, N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 74
(Supp. 1969). This section sets out the procedure for review of commitment at the request
of the committed person, a relative, or a friend.
45. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 85 (1965), as amended, N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 85
(Supp. 1969). This section sets out the procedure under which a civilly committed patient
can be transferred to Matteawan.
46. 19 N.Y.2d at 35, 224 N.E.2d at 92, 277 N.YS.2d at 660.
47. Id.
48. 410 F.2d at 1081.
49. Id. at 1082.
50. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (a convicted sex offender is entitled
to a hearing to determine Illness before sentence to an indefinite term); Bolton v. Harris,
395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is
entitled to a separate determination before commitment); Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d
193 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (the same); United States e-x rel. Carroll v. McNeill, 294 F.2d 117
(2d Cir. 1961), appeal dismissed as moot, 369 U.. 149 (1962) (an ex-convict who became
insane after release is entitled to the same rights before commitment as one who had no
criminal record). See also cases cited in note 41 supra.

330
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The Supreme Court struck down the New York system not because Baxstrom was
reaching the end of his sentence, but because it held dangerousness is not relevant to
the procedures for determining whether a "person is mentally ill at all....

"

Baxstrom

thus might be said to require the conclusion that while prior criminal conduct is
relevant to the determination whether a person is mentally ill and dangerous, it cannot justify denial of procedural safeguards for that determination.r l
Schuster then, like Lally, is also in "the spirit of Baxstrom." In fact, the
court noted that Baxstrom "sparked an awareness that we cannot tolerate two
classes of insane persons-criminal and non-criminal,--when we are asked to
examine commitment procedures available to both.1 52 Thus the court
concluded that section 383 violated the equal protection clause and held that:
[Bjefore a prisoner may be transferred to a state institution for insane criminals, he
must be afforded substantially the same procedural safeguards as are provided in
civil commitment proceedings, including proper examination, a hearing upon notice,
period- [sic] review of the need for commitment, and trial by jury. 3
The court then remanded the case, directing the district court to hold such
a hearing unless the state courts held a hearing within sixty days in accordance
with the specified procedures.
Finally, the court discussed, although it did not rule upon, Schuster's
alleged "right to treatment" 54 while confined at Dannemora. Noting that the
statutory language under which Schuster was committed "contemplates that a
prisoner will be committed to Dannemora only if he is mentally ill and in need
of treatment,"55 the court reasoned that the legislature must have presumed
that one so committed would receive the treatment "the need for which justified the commitment."56
One of the first cases to recognize such a right to treatment was Rouse v.
Cameron.57 There, Rouse was acquitted of possession of a dangerous weapon
and was committed to a state mental hospital. He brought a petition for habeas
corpus, claiming his confinement was illegal because he was not receiving
treatment. Citing its previous decision in Ragsdale v. Overholser,5 the court
noted:
51. Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
52. 410 F.2d at 1081.
53. Id. at 1073. It should be noted that the court said "substantially" and not "exactly" the same rights. The court noted that some differences could be tolerated. Among
those noted was that a determination that a prisoner was dangerous might not be required
before transfer to Matteawan. Although a civil patient is entitled to such a determination
before he can be transferred, the fact that security at Matteawan and Dannemora is better
and would thus discourage possible escape would be adequate grounds for different treatment. Id. at 1084.
54. The "right to treatment" philosophy was first expounded in Birnbaum, The Right
to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
55. 410 F.2d at 1087.
56. Id.
57. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
58. 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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Absent treatment, the hospital is "transform[ed] . . . into a penitentiary where
one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense, and this even though the
offense of which he was previously acquitted because
of doubt as to his sanity might
59
not have been one of the more serious felonies."
The court went on:
Had appellant been found criminally responsible, he could have been confined a
year, at most, however dangerous he might have been. He has been confined four
years and the end is not in sight. Since this difference rests only on need for
treatment, a failure to supply treatment may raise a question of due process of law.
It has also been suggested that a failure to supply treatment may violate the equal
protection clause.60
In Nason v. Superintendent,6' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reached a similar conclusion. There, Nason had been charged with the murder
of his wife, adjudged incompetent to stand trial and committed to Bridgewater
State Hospital, a facility operated by the Massachusetts Department of Correction. The court examined a report which stated that although treatment at
Bridgewater was substantially inferior to that provided in the state's other
mental hospitals and that Nason's treatment had been almost non-existent,
attempts were being made to improve the quality of the treatment. It therefore remanded the case to allow Bridgewater to improve generally and to give
Nason treatment in particular.
If [adequate] treatment is not available on a reasonable, nondiscriminatory basis,
there is substantial risk that constitutional requirements of equal protection of the
laws will not be satisfied ....
[I]f adequate treatment for Nason is not provided there within a reasonable time, the
legality of his further confinement may be presented to the county court.0 2
Although the decisions which have recognized a right to treatment have not
involved a person currently under penal sentence, the Schuster court noted,
"it may be that this difference in and of itself does not provide an adequate
basis for denying him the same protections."03 However, since Schuster did
not raise this question in the state courts, and since the state courts might
wish to examine the application of a prior ruling to one in Schuster's situation,"
the court declined "to consider whether Schuster may be further confined in
59. 373 F.2d at 453 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. (footnotes omitted).
61.
62.

353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E2d 908 (1968).
Id. at 612, 614, 233 N.E.2d at 914, 915.

63. 410 F.2d at 1088. The protection might be granted on equal protection grounds.
64. In People ex rel. "Anonymous" No. 1 v. La Burt, 17 N.Y.2d 738, 217 N.E.2d 31,
270 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1966), the court held that petitioner was mentally ill and denied his
petition for habeas corpus. The court noted that if petitioner conceded his illness, he would
have a remedy under N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law §§ 86, 88 to investigate the adequacy of
his treatment.
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Dannemora absent adequate treatment until he has presented his claims to a
state court." 0 5
In his strong dissent, Judge Moore characterized the majority opinion as
"judicial legislation by the federal courts."036 While he agreed with the majority in its conclusion that injustice had apparently been done and also
agreed that the situation should be remedied, Judge Moore felt that the remedy
should be left to the courts of New York. He viewed the majority opinion
as, in fact, enacting a law for New York as to the precise procedure which
must be afforded mentally ill prisoners.
He also took issue with the right to treatment argument as analyzed by the
majority. Although he agreed that there was a constitutional basis for such a
right, he noted:
How shocked would be the draftsmen of the Constitution if they had known that
they were protecting the right to treatment of the mentally ill exclusively for ultimate
federal court decision. Rather, in my opinion,
they would have said that such ques07
tions should be reserved for the States.
Judge Moore agreed with the majority that the issue should be decided by
the state courts and, further, he believed that the state courts would give
Schuster a hearing on the issue of sanity.
Finally, Judge Moore's dissent hit the opinion where it is probably most
vulnerable-the form of relief granted. He found a substantial inconsistency in
"telling Schuster to present his claims to a State court and remanding his case
to the district court"08 for a hearing if the state court did not hold one.
The procedural aspects of the opinion, then, should come as a surprise to no
one. They follow both legislative and judicial precedent and were probably inevitable in light of Baxstrom.00 It should also be noted that the court's decision
implements the recommendations of the Association of the Bar of the City of
70
New York.
The more interesting aspect of the opinion, then, is that yet another court
has added its voice to the defenders of the right to treatment philosophy. 71
Moreover, in denying certiorari, the Supreme Court has allowed Schuster to
remain as the strongest opinion in favor of the right to treatment in the country.
65. 410 F.2d at 1089.
66. Id. at 1091.
67. Id. at 1093.
68. Id. at 1094.
69. The court, moreover, indicated that the effect of its decision would probably be
slight. However, even if all the prisoners in Department of Correction hospitals should
demand their full procedural rights guaranteed by the decision, the court roted that "(ilf
we open any 'floodgate' today . ..it is only to provide a flood of long-overdue relief."
Id. at 1087.
70. See note 7 supra.
71. See Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis of the Confinement of Mentally III Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correction
of the State of New York, 17 Buffalo L. Rev. 651 (1968).
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Further, the District of Columbia Circuit, in a strong opinion by Judge Skelly
72
Wright, has cited Baxstrorn with approval.
Other courts have recognized that, given all the procedural safeguards possible
under the equal protection
clause, a mental patient may still find himself in a
"mental prison" 3 and not a mental hospital. As long as the state insists that
such persons be committed and separated from society, then it takes on the
corresponding obligation to see that these persons are adequately treated. The
Schuster court suggests that even those "twice cursed"7 4 have the right to such
treatment.

Constitutional Law-Requirement That a Convicted Indigent Reimburse
County for Assigned Counsel as a Condition of Probation Held to Violate
Sixth Amendment.-Plaintiff, an indigent, had been convicted of possession
of a dangerous drug without a prescription. She was put on probation, a
condition of which was that she reimburse the county for her assigned counsel.
Plaintiff sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that this condition
was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of California granted the writ
holding that the condition was a violation of plaintiff's right to counsel and
therefore unconstitutional. In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 409, 455 P.2d 143, 78
Cal. Rptr. 207 (1969).
The court's decision was based on the contention that the condition would
have a chilling effect on the exercise of the constitutionally protected right
to have counsel appointed. In four areas, courts have consistently refused
to permit legislation or procedures which might penalize a person for exercising his constitutional rights. It was for this reason that the Supreme Court
struck down the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act.'
According to that provision, a defendant could only receive the death penalty
if the jury so decided. He could thus, by waiving a jury trial, insure, at worst,
a life sentence. The Supreme Court found that the effect of this statute was
to deter a suspect from requesting a jury trial,2 a right guaranteed him under
the sixth amendment. 3
In a second case 4 the Supreme Court found that a defendant who invoked
Matthews v. Hardy, - F2d - (No. 22,315 D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 1969).
73. See Morris, supra note 71, at 652.
74. 410 F2d at 1073.
72.

1. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964). Under this statute a jury's recommendation was required
for the imposition of the death penalty. See also Seadlund v. United States, 97 F.2d 742
(7th Cir. 1938); Robinson v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Ky. 1967), aff'd per
curiam, 394 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969).
2. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). "[Tlhe death penalty provision of
the Federal Kidnapping Act imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional right . .. .2' Id. at 572.
3. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
4. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). In referring to comment on the failure to
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the fifth amendment and would not testify in his own behalf should not have
his silence commented upon by judge5 or prosecutor.6 The Court reasoned
that if such comment were permitted, a defendant might feel compelled to
7
testify, in contravention of his right not to incriminate himself.
8
The third situation involved a state statute which provided that a public
employee must waive his right not to testify before a grand jury under threat
of discharge. 9 The Court found that the fear of losing his employment might
well cause the employee to forego his absolute constitutional right against
self-incrimination.'"
In still another set of circumstances," the Court ruled that legislation
providing that teachers could not be hired unless they first submitted a list
of all associations and organizations to which they belonged 1 2 was an uncon13
stitutional infringement on the teachers' freedom of association.
In all of these cases the Court's rationale was that "[w]here rights secured
by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation
which would abrogate them.' 4 It is readily understandable that once a condition is placed on a constitutional right, this right ceases to be absolute and
is thus subject to arbitrary limits and restraints.' 5 In speaking of the motivating forces which prompt such legislation to be enacted at the expense of the
rights of the accused, the Court said, "[w]hatever might be said of Congress'
objectives, they cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the exercise
of basic constitutional rights."'"
The right to counsel is secured for every person by the sixth amendment.
Only recently, however, has it been established that this amendment contemplates not only those who can afford counsel, but those who are indigent.' 7
testify the Court said, "[it is a penalty imposed by the courts for exercising a constitutional
privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." Id. at 614. See also
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
5. 380 U.S. at 610.
6. Id. at 615.
7. Id.
8. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968). The Supreme Court said, "[in any event,
the mandate of the great privilege against self-incrimination does not tolerate the attempt,
regardless of its ultimate effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on penalty
of the loss of employment." Id. at 279. See also Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) ; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) ; Spevack v. Klein,
385 U.S. 511 (1967).
9. N.Y. Cost. art. 1, § 6; N.Y. City Charter §1123 (1963).
10. See U.S. Coast. amend. V.
11. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
12. No. 10 [1958] Ark. Acts (2d Ex. Sess.) at 2018.
13. "The statute's comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes far beyond
what might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into the fitness and
competency of its teachers." 364 U.S. at 490.
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966).
15. Id. at 478-79.
16. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, (1968) 582 (emphasis added).
17. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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In the case of the indigent, the state and the private attorney must bear the
financial burden.' 8 Even though this idea is comparatively new, it is rarely
opposed. 19 It is recognized that ". . . reason and reflection require us to
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him."'20 The reasoning is simple: a fair trial
is essential to due process and the assistance of counsel is essential to a fair
trial. 21 The right of the indigent to counsel is as constitutionally protected as
that of the wealthy.
The practice of compelling repayment to the county for assigned counsel
as a condition of an indigent's probation must be examined in light of the
previously mentioned line of cases.2 If an indigent is aware that the legal
services offered him gratuitously in the beginning of the proceedings might
later result in his not being released on probation, will not his right to the
assistance of counsel be affected? If he is guilty and feels he will be convicted,
will he be inclined to add to his problems the dilemma of reincarceration or
repayment? And if he is innocent, why should he risk indebtedness if he believes
that he could be exonerated without additional expense simply by cooperating?
Finally, there is the question of fairness in making the indigent defendant
responsible for a contract when he was a party neither to the process of the
attorney's selection nor to the agreement as to the attorney's fee. This certainly
is not in accord with the well-settled contract principle;- that one who was
24
not a party to a contract is not liable on that contract.
The foregoing was the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California. On
the peculiar facts of the Allen case, the reasoning is not open to serious
question. Since the financial status of the indigent did not improve between
the date counsel was first appointed and the date of probation, the attaching
of the reimbursement condition tended to render the idea of "free counsel
for the indigent" somewhat hollow. Even if, as in the Alkn case, the defendant
did not understand the court's intention until it was too late to affect his
decision as to whether or not to exercise his right to have counsel appointed,
the effect would be to deter others who later learned of the practice.2
One problem which the Supreme Court of California did not consider was
whether the condition constituted a denial of equal protection. The California
Penal Code required that probation conditions be reasonable and that they
18. See the rates provided for by the Criminal Justice Act, 18 US.C. § 3006A(d) (Supp.
IV, 1969).
19. Cf. Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967); Nielsen v. Turner, 287
F. Supp. 116 (D. Utah 1968).
20. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 344.

21. Id.
22. See text accompanying notes 4-12 supra.
23. See 1 S. Wiflliston, Contracts § 36 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1957).

24. Indeed, it would undermine the integrity of the court since the court seemingly has
acted inconsistently with its promise to make counsel available gratuitously.
25. In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d at 413, 455 P.2d at 145, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (1969).
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be designed for the rehabilitation of the probationer.2 6 It may indeed be
reasonable to require a non-indigent to pay his attorney in that his compliance with such a condition would evidence a rehabilitative state of mind.
But the same test applied in the case of an indigent would show that the
condition cannot stand. In this case, it is not reasonable, since the court
in assigning counsel has already determined that the indigent is unable to
pay. Furthermore, although in the case of a non-indigent, his compliance with
such a condition would indicate a rehabilitative state of mind, in the case of
an indigent, his compliance would indicate nothing, since it is not unwillingness
but inability which causes his failure to comply. The elements of rehabilitation and reasonableness then would only be present in the case of a person
capable of complying.27 A denial of equal protection of the laws is certainly
a valid finding in any situation
where the poor defendant is at a disadvantage
28
as compared to the rich one.
The problem with the Allen decision lies in the broad language of the
opinion. The court did not restrict its reasoning to the particular facts-a
probation situation with an indigent whose financial position has not changed.
The court implied that once counsel is appointed for the indigent with the
understanding that he will not have to pay for it, under no circumstances
would it be constitutional to order him to pay all or part of the counsel fees.
This would seemingly include a situation where the person ceases to be indigent.
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 provides that each district court with
the approval of the circuit shall place in operation a plan for furnishing
representation for defendants who are financially unable to obtain an adequate defense. 29 The Second Circuit has such a plan, which contains the
following provision:
If at any time after the appointment of counsel the District Judge finds that the
defendant is financially able to obtain counsel or to make partial payment for his
representation, the District Judge may terminate the appointment of counsel or he
may direct that payment be made to the appointed counsel or to the bar association
which made such counsel available for appointment or to the Legal Aid Society.8o
A simple illustration will show that in given circumstances the case under
discussion would require a different result than the above provision. Suppose
A, an indigent defendant accused of a felony, is assigned counsel for what
proves to be a lengthy and costly proceeding. After several months, the trial
nearing conclusion, A inherits a large sum of money. The judge orders A to
pay his own fees for the entire proceeding. A objects citing Allen.
26. Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1968). For an analysis of other state's requirements see Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 181 (1967).
27. Rehabilitation may be indirectly present to the extent that payment of the debt would
probably necessitate finding employment which itself is considered rehabilitative.
28. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The Court found a requirement that
would-be appellants pay for a transcript to be a denial of equal protection of the laws
to those who could not afford it.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1964).
30. Plans Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)) (Second
Circuit 1968).
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The court's direction in this hypothetical case is certainly consistent with
the Second Circuit provision. But the broad language of the court in the
Allen case suggests that perhaps the provision violates the sixth amendment.
To resolve the apparent conflict, it is necessary to examine A's initial choice
and his motives-both of which are relevant to the constitutional theory
underlying assignment of counsel for the indigent.
A's right to have counsel appointed is predicated on his indigency. But
this does not entitle him to any greater right than a non-indigent. Once it is
determined that he qualifies as indigent, it must be asked what is really being
protected by affording him the right to have counsel made available at the
expense of others. Is it A's right to have counsel assigned merely because he
qualifies, even though he would not have hired a lawyer himself had he sufficient funds? It would seem that what is guaranteed is that if A is willing to

pay but cannot, then his inability is not permitted to affect his chance of a
fair trial. In the normal situation, however, it cannot be ascertained whether a
given indigent would hire a lawyer if he were of limited but adequate funds.3 '
But if it could be ascertained, it would be unfair and indeed a denial of equal
protection of the laws to those of modest means who must shoulder the
burden themselves, to permit A to avoid paying when and if he subsequently
becomes 32able to do so. For it is ability and not willingness that is determninative.
The Allen case is consistent with the line of cases previously discussed3
because freedom, in the form of probation, is at stake. The indigent is risking
34
the penalty of incarceration by exercising his right to have counsel assigned.
The fear of such penalty is indeed likely to have a chilling effect on this
exercise. But the hypothetical case is distinguishable from that line of cases.
It is no penalty for the indigent to be required to pay his attorney's fees.
This is a just debt, payment of which is due when the indigent becomes able.
The right to have counsel appointed endures only so long as the condition
of indigency endures. Fear of payment being exacted would only deter an
indigent from exercising his right to have counsel appointed where, were he
not indigent, he would not wish to hire and pay an attorney. It is arguable
that courts should not recognize this as a chilling effect.
In practice the courts rarely make further inquiry as to the financial status
of the indigent once counsel has been appointed. 35 Also, a recent study of
the spending habits of indigent or near indigent consumers has disclosed a
penchant on their part for purchasing on credit.30 This might lead to the
31. As provided in the Criminal Justice Act, the determination of indigency is to be made
by a commissioner and the suspect is required to sign an affidavit of indigency.
32. Here the rights of the poor are equal to those of the rich; they are not superior.
33. See text accompanying notes 4-12 supra.
34. See Siegal, Gideon, and Beyond: Achieving an Adequate Defense for the Indigent,

59 Crim. L.C. &PS. 73 (1968).
35. See P. Martineau, Social Classes and Spending Behavior, in Understanding Consumer
Behavior (M. Grossack ed. 1964).
36. See Note, Adequate Representation for Defendants in Federal Criminal Casses: Appointment of Counsel Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 758, 773
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conclusion that further debt or obligation would not necessarily act as a
deterrent. A suggestion which might be drawn from the case, however, is
that in those districts which have provisions for recovery and reimbursement 37 the defendant should be advised of that possibility. This would
alleviate the objection as to contractual liability raised earlier.
Thus, in those few instances that an indigent subsequently becomes able
to pay, and the court becomes aware of this ability, the exacting of repayment
does not appear to be repugnant to the Constitution. The Second Circuit
provision and others like it should be followed with the Allen decision restricted to its facts.

Constitutional Law-Residence Requirements for Tuition Purposes Held
Not Violative of Equal Protection.-Petitioner, an Ohio resident, married a

California resident on July 1, 1967, and moved to California with her husband
on July 13, 1967, with the intent of making that state her permanent home.
When she enrolled in the University of California in the fall of 1967, she
was classified as a nonresident student according to the California statute,
which contained a one year residence requirement," and was charged the
higher nonresident tuition fee. She brought an action alleging that the one
year residence requirement infringed on her right to travel and was therefore
unconstitutional according to the rule of Shapiro v. Thompson.2 The trial
court dismissed her complaint.3 On appeal, the California Court of Appeal
held that residence requirements for tuition purposes did not affect the right
to travel, and therefore did not fall within the purview of Shapiro. The court
held such requirements to be neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, thus not
violating the equal protection clause. 4 Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App.
2d 463, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
Prior to Shapiro, the courts had considered the constitutionality of residence
requirements in three major areas: voting, tuition at state universities, and
welfare. In most of these cases, the basic inquiry was whether or not such
statutes were reasonably related to a legitimate state interest or purpose.
This test is what the Supreme Court has called the "traditional" equal protection test.5
n.113 (1966) (mentioning among others, Plan 9th Cir. 8(a); Plan D. Mass. (F); Plan D.
N..

C(1) (k)).

37. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
1. Cal. Educ. Code § 23054 (West 1969) reads in part: "A 'resident student' means any
person who has been a bona fide resident of the State for more than one year immediately preceding the opening day of a semester during which he proposes to attend the
university."
2. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
3. See Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 463, 466, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 261
(Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
4. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. 394 U.S. at 638. See Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954); Lindsley v. Natural
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In Drueding v. Devlin,G one of the early voting cases, a federal district
court held that a one year state and six month's county residence requirement for voting purposes was reasonably connected with the legitimate state
interests of protecting Maryland citizens against voter fraud, and in insuring that all its voters have a stake in their community.1 However, in
Carrington v. Rash, 8 a provision of the Texas constitution prohibiting nonresident members of the Armed Forces from ever becoming residents of Texas
for voting purposes was struck down. The Supreme Court held that the
absolute presumption of nonresidence for a tenuous administrative advantage
created an invidious classification denying servicemen equal protection of

the laws. 10

Statutes imposing residence requirements for lower tuition at state universities have also been upheld as being rationally related to the purpose
of financing the state's higher educational facilities." In Clarke v. Redeker,'2
a federal district court held that a regulation of the State University of
Iowa classifying students as residents or nonresidents for tuition purposes
was "not arbitrary and unreasonable and bears a rational relation to Iowa's
object and purpose of financing, operating and maintaining its educational
institutions."' 3 Where, however, such statutes created an absolute presumption of nonresidence for all out of state students, i.e., the student was not
afforded the opportunity to prove his subsequent residence, they have been
held to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of equal protection."4
Unlike the decisions with respect to voting and tuition, there was a decided split in authority in those cases dealing with residence requirements for
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 US. 61 (1911); American Commuters Ass'n v. Levitt, 279 F.
Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
6. 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd mem., 380 US. 125 (1965).
7. 234 F. Supp. at 724. See also Hall v. Beals, 292 F. Supp. 610 (D. Colo. 1968),

vacated per curiam as moot, 38 US.L.W. 4006 (1969), where a three judge district court,
citing Drueding v. Devlin, held that a Colorado statute imposing a six month residence requirement for voting for President and Vice-President of the United States wms not so unreasonable as to constitute a denial of equal protection.
8. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).

9. The state of Texas alleged that it was too difficult to determine whether or not a
serviceman stationed in that state (who is necessarily a transient due to the nature of
military assignments) has become a "true" resident. The advantage of the constitutional
provision is that it obviously does away with the necessity of making this determination.
380 U.S. at 94-95. The Court pointed out that other persons in similar situations (e.g.,
students, hospital patients and civilian employees of the United States government) were
given the opportunity to prove Texas residence for voting purposes. Id. at 95. Furthermore, Texas had determined residence for servicemen for purposes other than voting (eg,
divorce jurisdiction). Id. at 95-96. Thus, the alleged administrative advantage of the
constitutional provision was described by the Court as "remote." Id. at 96.
10. Id. at 96.
11. Bryan v. Regents, 188 Cal. 559, 205 P. 1071 (1922).
12. 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
13. Id. at 123.
14. Newman v. Graham, 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960).
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obtaining welfare benefits. Such requirements have been upheld as being

reasonable methods to provide relief to bona fide state residents;16 to protect
the taxpayer;' 6 and to place conditions on benefits which the states (or Congress) are not obligated to provide.' 7 On the other hand welfare residence
statutes have been declared arbitrary and unreasonable as being contrary to
the purpose of the state's welfare laws;' 8 as not being reasonable methods
to accomplish their avowed purposes (either to keep out of the state those

who would enter solely to obtain 20welfare or to protect the budget);19 and
as having no purpose whatsoever.

The early court decisions usually limited their constitutional consideration

solely to the issue of reasonableness. Shapiro v. Thompson 2

a landmark

welfare decision, provided the United States Supreme Court with its first
opportunity to consider the effect of residency requirements on the constitu-

tional right of interstate travel. 22 In Shapiro, respondents were residents of
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania. They all applied

for welfare in their respective jurisdictions, and were denied aid since they
had not been residents for at least a year prior to their applications for

welfare assistance. They brought actions alleging that such requirements were
as such, constiunconstitutional interferences with their right
23 to travel, and,

tuted a denial of equal protection of the law.

On appeal the Supreme Court held that the right to travel was fundamen15. People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 566, 30 N.E.2d 46, 51 (1940).
See 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 544 (1941).
16. Harrell v. Board of Comm'rs, 269 F. Supp. 919, 921 (D.D.C. 1967).
17. Id. at 921; People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 565, 30 N.E.2d 46, 51.
18. Robertson v. Ott, 284 F. Supp. 735, 738 (D. Mass. 1968); Harrell v. Tobriner, 279
F. Supp. 22, 27 (D.D.C. 1967); Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173,
177 (D. Del. 1967),
19. "Even if we assume, however, that some people move in order to enjoy a greener
welfare pasture, and that a state may properly deny aid payments to persons who come
with that intent, we think the one year residence requirement is not reasonable In the light
of such purpose. It has the effect of a conclusive presumption that all people who need
aid within a year have come for that purpose." Ramos v. Health and Social Services Bd.,
276 F. Supp. 474, 478 (ED. Wis. 1967) (note the parallel between this argument and the
reasoning in Newman v. Graham, 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960), where a conclusive
presumption that all students who had not resided within the state of Idaho for one year
were in the state solely for educational purposes, was similarly held as unreasonable).
20. Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65, 67 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
21. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
22. The right to travel is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. For a summary
of the various constitutional arguments utilized by the courts to justify this right, see
394 U.S. at 630 n.8. For a more complete discussion of these justifications, see 394 U.S.
at 666-71 (dissenting opinion) ; 36 Fordham L. Rev. 612, 613-14 (1968).
23. Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967); Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F.
Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967).
Thompson v. Shapiro, supra, has been the subject of extensive comment in the Law
Reviews. See, e.g., 36 Fordham L. Rev. 612 (1968); 53 Iowa L. Rev. 491 (1967); 52 Minn.
L. Rev. 561 (1967); 29 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 138 (1967).

1969]

CASE NOTES

341

tal,24 and that the welfare residence statutes were a penalty on the exercise
of this right. 25 As a result of this infringement, the Court rejected the contention that a showing of a rational relationship between the statutes and
legitimate state objectives would be sufficient to satisfy the equal protection
clause,2 6 and went on to hold that only a compelling governmental interest
could justify the waiting period requirement. 27 Employing this "compelling
interest" test, the Court found that neither the protection of the state's
fiscal integrity, 28 the facilitation of budget predictability,209 administrative
efficiency,30 nor protection against fraud3 1 were sufficient "compelling interests"
to justify the existence of residency requirements. In addition, the purpose
of keeping indigents seeking welfare out of the state was held to be constitutionally impermissible in the light of this test.32 The Court also stated that
§ 402(b) of the Social Security Act 3 was unconstitutional to the extent
that the statute may authorize the imposition of such requirements. 3' Chief
Justice Warren, joined by Justice Black dissented. The Chief Justice reasoned
that whatever burden was imposed on the right to travel, that burden was
imposed on interstate commerce, 35 that Congress had consented to state
regulation of this commerce, 36 and that Congress had a rational basis for
doing
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

So.3 7

The restriction on the right to travel was also thought by the

394 U.S. at 629.
Id. at 634.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 634.

30. Id. at 636.
31. Id. at 637.
32. Id. at 631.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1964). This statute requires the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare to disapprove any state plan for aid which imposes a residence requirement
of greater than one year.
34. 394 U.S. at 641. The Court also expressed the opinion that it did not think that
§ 402(b) authorized such requirements but rather that the statute merely allowed the
states to set them up without risking the penalty of losing federal aid. Id. at 639. In holding
the statute unconstitutional to the extent that it might have authorized residence requirements, the Court was obviously attempting to cover all possibilities. This seems to be a
departure from the rule expressed in Crowell v. Benson, 285 US. 22, 62 (1932) where
it was stated that "[w]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question ...
it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." Under this rule, the
holding of unconstitutionality of § 402(b) would seem unnecessary.
35. 394 U.S. at 648 (dissenting opinion). The transportation of persons has long been
regarded as "commerce." See Hoke v. United States, 227 US. 308, 320 (1913). In Caminetti
v. United States, 242 US. 470, 491 (1917) the Supreme Court held that the congressional
prohibition of the transportation of persons interstate for immoral purposes "has its constitutional sanction in the power of Congress over interstate commerce."
36. 394 US. at 644-45 (dissenting opinion).
37. Id. at 651 (dissenting opinion).
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Chief Justice to be insubstantial. 38 He warned of the effect of the decision
on other state laws3 9 involving residency requirements such as professional
licensing, voting and attendance at state universities.40
In each of the lower court cases, it was determined whether or not residence
requirements were reasonable prerequisites for voting, tuition or welfare grants.
If the statute was reasonable, it passed constitutional scrutiny. Shapiro changed
the emphasis in residency cases from "reasonableness" to a demand that the
41
state prove a compelling governmental interest.
The application of the Shapiro holding to other areas was not specifically
considered by the Court. In a footnote to its opinion the Court did state
that "[w]e imply no view of . . . residence requirements determining eligi-

bility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to
practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may
promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may
not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate
travel. '42 In Kirk the California Court of Appeal was required to interpret
the tuition residence requirement in terms of the right to travel and the
"compelling interest" test dictated by Shapiro. At this point, the court was
at a crossroads in the law. It could find that the tuition residence requirement
either infringed on the right to travel, in which case the coverage of the rules
set forth in Shapiro would be extended, or it could hold that the right to
travel was not affected, and that the equal protection standards utilized in
residence cases prior to Shapiro would control. The California court chose
the second of these alternatives. It held that the tuition residence classification
"does not deter any appreciable number of persons from . . . moving into

the state. '43 The increasing population of the state of California was cited
to support this conclusion. 44 Since the right to travel was held not to be
affected, the court stated that the tuition residency requirement did not have
to be justified by a "compelling state interest," and that the "ordinary"
(pre-Shapiro) "reasonableness" test could be applied. 45 The court went on
to say that "[t]he higher tuition charged nonresident students tends to distribute more evenly the cost of operating and supporting the University of

38. Id. at 650 (dissenting opinion).
39. "If a State would violate equal protection by denying welfare benefits to those
who have recently moved interstate, then it would appear to follow that equal protection
would also be denied by depriving those who have recently moved interstate of the fundamental right to vote." 394 U.S. at 654 (dissenting opinion).
40. Id. at 655 (dissenting opinion).
41. Id. at 634, 638. It is probable that the welfare residence requirements would not
have passed even the traditional test in that "appellants in these cases do not use and
have no need to use the one-year requirement . . . .Thus, even under traditional equal
protection tests . .. [a one year residence classification] would seem irrational. . . ." Id.
at 638.
42. 394 U.S. at 638 n.21.
43. 273 Cal. App. 2d at 473, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
44. Id. 474 n.10, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 266 n.10.
45. Id. at 474, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
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California between residents and nonresidents attending the university...
[I]t appears to be a reasonable attempt to achieve a partial cost equalization. . .. -46 The court also held that the residence statute was neither arbitrary
nor unreasonable since, although all out of state students are presumed to
be in California solely for educational purposes, this presumption is rebuttable, and can be controverted by sufficient evidence of residence. 47 Thus,
the durational residence requirement was held to be reasonable and rationally
related to a legitimate state interest, thereby satisfying the "traditional" equal
protection test. 48
The distinction drawn by the California court is a realistic one. The patent
purposes of establishing residence requirements for welfare benefits was, at
least in part, to prevent an influx of indigents from entering the enacting
state to receive aid. 49 In contrast, the purpose of California with respect to
its tuition residency requirements was merely the equitable distribution of
costs.50 There was certainly no obvious inhibition on migration into the
state. It is possible, however, to find, despite the absence of an inhibitory
purpose, that the inevitable effect of the tuition residence requirement is to
penalize interstate travel.5 ' If so, then the state would be required to satisfy
46. Id. at 474, 78 Cal. Reptr. at 269.
47. Id. at 477, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 268-69. The applicable statute contains no mention of
such a presumption. See supra note 1. In Murphy v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d
582, 207 P.2d 595 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949) the court stated that "[a] domicile once acquired
is presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed, and to constitute the new
domicile two things are indispensable: First, residence in the new locality; and second, the
intention to remain there." Id. at 587, 207 P.2d at 597. It is possible that the reasoning
behind this case formed the basis for the similar conclusion in Kirk. If, in fact,
the statute does not contain a rebuttable presumption, i.e., there is no way to establish
residency in the case of out of state students, then the statute is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, and constitutes a deprivation of equal protection. See notes 8, 14 & 19 supra.
In Kirk, the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to prove her residence, subsequent
to her marriage, by Cal. Gov't Code § 244(e) (West, 1966) which reads: "The residence
of the husband is the residence of the wife, provided that a married woman who is
separated from her husband may establish her own residence." This statute would not
help the petitioner win her case, however, since she had not been married for at least
one year prior to her admission to the University of California, and the court held that
she could not "tack on" the period of her husband's residence in California prior to their
marriage. 273 Cal. App. 2d at 469-70, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64.
48. 273 Cal. App. at 478, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
49. "There is weighty evidence that exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor who
need or may need relief was the specific objective of these provisions." 394 U.S. at 628.
50. 273 Cal. App. 2d at 477-78, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
51. The argument used by the court in Kirk, that the increasing California population
leads to the conclusion that the tuition residency requirement does not affect the right to
travel, is particularly weak. Welfare residence requirements did not affect the right to
travel of the general population, rather they only affected a limited class of persons, i.e.
indigents. Still, the Court held that the residence classifications were a penalty on the right
to travel interstate. Similarly, although tuition residence requirements may not affect the
travel of the general population, they could be struck down as inhibiting the right to
travel of a limited class--students. "Residence tests impose a severe burden on interstate
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the compelling interest test. Shapiro is a landmark case. Whether it is but the
first of many future landmarks which will lead to the complete nullification of
residency requirements in all areas of the law remains to be seen. Mr. Justice
Brennan's footnote in Shapiro may indicate that the Court will travel slowly
and cautiously along that road.

Criminal Law-Third Party Consent-Implied Coercion-Exception to
General Rule That Search Warrant Has Coercive Effect on Subsequent
Consent.-Police had obtained a search warrant authorizing the search of
defendant, a high school student, and his school locker. The warrant was
presented to the school vice-principal and, during a brief interrogation in
the vice-principal's office, defendant was asked if he had marijuana in his
locker. Defendant merely nodded in an uncertain manner, but after some
persistence replied either "I guess so" or "Maybe." Defendant, the viceprincipal, and a police detective then went to defendant's locker which the
vice-principal opened with his master key. Marijuana was found in the
locker inside defendant's jacket. Subsequently, the court of special sessions
held the warrant to be ineffective insofar as the search of the locker was
concerned and convicted defendant, upon his guilty plea, of unlawful possession of a narcotic drug.1 The Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department, reversed on the ground that the vice-principal's consent was not
binding on defendant. 2 The court of appeals reinstated the holding of the
court of special sessions. 3 Upon rehearing ordered by the United States
Supreme Court,4 the New York court again found defendant guilty on the
grounds that the vice-principal bad sufficient control over defendant's locker
to consent to a search and such consent was not coerced by the fact that the
police claimed to have a warrant. People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.
2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969).
The importance of procuring a search warrant lies in the fact that the
Supreme Court has held that a search, in order to be reasonable," must
normally be conducted pursuant to a warrant. 6 However, not every search
movement, if severity is judged from the standpoint of the relevant citizens .... " Harvith,
The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical Assistance Programs,
54 Calif. L. Rev. 567, 589 (1966).
1. See People v. Overton, 51 Misc. 2d 140, 273 N.Y.S.2d 143 (App. T. 1966).
2.

Id.

3. People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
4. Overton v. New York, 393 U.S. 85 (1968).
5. Mr. Justice Frankfurter saw two protections emerging from the fourth amendment's broad proscription against official invasion: the right to be secure from intrusion
into personal privacy and the right of self protection. He observed that "evidence of criminal
action may not, save in very limited and closely confined situations, be seized without a
judicially issued search warrant." Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
6. E.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613 (1961); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1921).
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requires a warrant. Searches and seizures may also be conducted pursuant to a
lawful arrest7 or as a result of a free and voluntary consent.8
The courts have held that "consent is the weakest possible basis for a
search and must be shown to have been freely and voluntarily given. ' The
weakness of a consent search is more pronounced when a third party consents since the voluntariness aspect must be combined with the actual ability
of the third party to consent.'
The Supreme Court has said little with regard to the relationships necessary
for third parties validly to give their consent to a search." The Court has,
however, set up a broad outline for the lower courts to follow by its strong
emphasis on the protection of personal rights. In Jones v. United States,2 the
Court indicated that the right to object to a search is based on the protection of the individual rather than just the property right of the owner of
the searched premises.' 3 Accordingly, Jones was cited as authority in Stoner

v.Calijornia'4 and Chapman v. United States's to support the holding that
it is the individual's personal rights which are protected by the fourth

amendment. In Chapman, a landlord gave police permission to enter a tenant's
leased premises for the purpose of searching for illegally distilled alcohol.
The permission was held invalid by the Court, which concluded that there

was an invasion of the tenant's personal right of protection under the fourth
amendment.' 6 Similarly, in Stoner, a hotel clerk's consent to the search of a
guest's room was struck down by the Court. Here the Court said, "It is
important to bear in mind that it was the petitioner's constitutional right
which was at stake here, and not the night clerk's or the hotel's." 17 However,
the Court did not preclude the possibility of a defendant consenting through
7. People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 179 N.E.2d 478, 482, 223 N.YS.2d 462, 466
(1961), overruled on other grounds, People v. McQueen, 18 N.Y.2d 337, 344, 221 N.E2d
550, 553, 274 N.Y.S.2d 886, 890 (1966).
8. McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9, 14, 202 A.2d 320, 323 (1964).
9. People v. Gonzalez, 50 Misc. 2d 508, 509, 270 N.YS.2d 727, 728 (App. T. 1966);
accord, Amos v. United States, 255 US. 313 (1921); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649
(D.C. Cir. 1951); United States v. Gregory, 204 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
10. In New York, the burden of proving voluntariness is on the state. People v. Austin,
53 Misc. 2d 963, 964, 280 N.Y.S.2d 433, 435 (Nassau Dist. Ct. 1967).
11. Note, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure, 1967 Wash. U.L.Q. 12, 36. The
Supreme Court has ruled a landlord cannot consent for a tenant, Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), and that a hotel clerk cannot consent for a guest, Stoner v.
California, 376 US. 483 (1964). It has never passed on the right of a father to consent
for his son, State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 410, 136 N.W2d 577, 581 (1965), nor
considered the possibility of a wife waiving her husband's right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
12. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
13. See 41 St. John's L. Rev. 82 (1966) for a discussion of the relationship between
Jones v. United States, Stoner v. California and Chapman v. United States.
14. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
15. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
16. Id. at 617.
17. 376 U.S. at 489.
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an agent.' 8 Thus, without enumerating the exact relationships which would
be necessary, the Supreme Court has held that a third party can consent to
a search, provided that the defendant's personal rights are protected at all
times.
The state and lower federal courts have reached varying decisions as to
who can consent, ranging from the holding that there can be no third party
consent' 9 to the holding that there is a reasonable search even where police
are mistaken as to the third person's authority.20 In attempting to classify
the majority of holdings which fall between these extremes, commentators
have stressed two theories: the implied or apparent authority of third persons and the property right of control. 2 1 These theories, however, would seem
to be too rigid to encompass the protection of personal rights emphasized
in Chapman and Stoner and, in fact, the courts have increasingly utilized
a "reasonableness" element in reaching their decisions. 22 Nevertheless, such
theories are valid in that the majority of cases can basically be grouped into
one or the other classification.
The implied or apparent authority theory "is utilized by courts to legitimatize a search and seizure consented to by a third party whose legal interest
in the property . . . is inferior to the interest of the person against whom
the search is directed and the evidence used. ' 2 3 In State v. Cook, 2" a caretaker given a key and told to care for the property for 10 to 15 days was

deemed to have sufficient control to consent to a search of the premises. In

Morris v. Commonwealth,25 the court held that "the head of a house, or the

one in charge of the house at the time a search is made, may consent to its
search .... --21 Also, the belief that a marine officer had authority to consent
18. See 376 U.S. 483. The Supreme Court of Hawaii carried this statement of the
Court (supra note 16) to an extreme in State v. Matias, 451 P.2d 257, 260 (Hawaii 1969),
when it held, "the Fourth Amendment right may be waived only by the individual entitled
to the right." However, the Court in Stoner expressly stated that a person could consent
through an agent. 376 U.S. at 489.
19. E.g., State v. Matias, 451 P.2d 257 (Hawaii 1969); Maxey v. State, 244 N.E.2d 6.50
(Ind. 1969); Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952).
20. People v. Shepard, 212 Cal. App. 2d 697, 28 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
21. E.g., 41 St. John's L. Rev. 82, 83-84 (1966); 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 797, 801 (1966).
See generally 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 260, 272 (1964); 2 U. San Francisco L. Rev. 141 (1967).
22. See note 34 infra.
23. 41 St. John's L. Rev. 82, 84 (1966). The Stoner case tended to limit the apparent
authority theory when it stated: "Our decisions make clear that the rights protected by
the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency
or by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority." 376 U.S. at 488. This statement would
not seem to eliminate all implied or apparent authority relationships, but simply is further
evidence of the Court's desire to protect the individual by eliminating strained applications
of agency and unrealistic doctrines of apparent authority. See 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 797, 802
(1966).
24. 242 Ore. 509, 411 P.2d 78 (1966).
25. 306 Ky. 349, 208 S.W.2d 58 (1948).
26. Id. at 352, 208 S.W.2d at 60 (emphasis added).

1969]

CASE NOTES

to a search of a sailor's locker was deemed sufficient to make the search

reasonable in People v. Shepard.27 Other courts have held that where
one gives complete and unrestricted freedom over his property he will be
held to have assumed the risk that such third person will consent to a
search. 28 Thus, it appears that the implied or apparent authority theory is an
important factor in state and lower federal court decisions.
The second major theory is the property right of control theory. "The
rationale . . . is that, since both [defendant and the third party] are entitled to possession and control, either can validly consent to a search in
which the evidence seized may be used against the non-consenting party. " 9
The vast majority of jurisdictions rely on this doctrine, and hence consent
by a third person has been held valid where the third person has a superior
right of control3" and where the right of control is equal. 3 '
Cognizant of the fact that these theories deemphasize the personal aspect
of the rights involved,3 2 the courts have been using a reasonableness test in
dealing with the third party consent. In United States v. Robertsas it was
said that "courts are not concerned ultimately with whether the person giving
the consent ... was the agent of such person or had authority from him, but
rather with the question of whether the officers making the search and ef27. 212 Cal. App. 2d 697, 28 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
28. E.g., Sartain v. United States, 303 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894
(1962); United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962). See generally 2 U. San
Francisco L. Rev. 141 (1967).
29. 41 St. John's L. Rev. 82, 84 (1966).
30. E.g., Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.. 944 (1965);
United States ex rel McKenna v. Myers, 232 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1964), afd mem., 342
F.2d 998 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 857 (1965); Rees v. Peyton, 225 F. Supp. 507
(E.D. Va. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965); Tomlinson v. State, 129 Fla. 658, 176
So. 543 (1937); Morris v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 349, 208 S.W.2d 58 (1948); McCray
v. State, 236 Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320 (1964); State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.
2d 577 (1965).
31. E.g., Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
981 (1969) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1019 (1966); People v. Palmer, 26 IIl. 2d 464, 187 N.E.2d 216 (1963); People
v. Sapienza, 51 Misc. 2d 786, 274 N.YS.2d 32 (Nassau County Ct. 1966). Contra, State v.
Matias, 451 P.2d 257 (Hawaii 1969); Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952).
See generally 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 797 (1966). In Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915 (4th
Cir. 1965), defendant and his mother lived with defendant's sister. The mother consented to a search of defendant's room but the court held that the search was unreasonable. Here a mother consented for her son but since she had no property right of
control of the things searched, her consent was invalid.
32. The Supreme Court in Stoner warned of the dangers of the implied or apparent
authority theory. The property right of control theory also carries its dangers. For
example, a father who bought the furniture in his son's room could consent to the search
of "the father's" bureau drawer. The courts have attempted to deal with this by holding
that the owner of property cannot consent to a search of "papers and effects." See Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966). See also note 59 infra.
33. 223 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Ark. 1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 US. 980 (1965).
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fecting the seizure acted fairly and reasonably on the one hand, or unfairly,
oppressively, or unreasonably on the other hand." 34 Many jurisdictions, while
discussing the theories of apparent authority or a property right of control,
ultimately make some mention of the fact that their decision is based on the
issue of reasonableness.8" It would seem that if the implied or apparent
authority and property right of control theories are used as aids in determining the reasonableness of a third party consent along with other significant
factors,88 the Supreme Court's broad guidelines suggested in Jones, Stoner,
37
and Chapman can be effectively followed.
Another major problem in third party consent cases is the question of
implied coercion. Amos v. United States,38 the leading case on this issue,
noted the aura of police authority and its effect on the voluntariness of a
wife's consent given to police to search for contraband whiskey. "[I]t is
perfectly clear that under the implied coercion here presented, no such waiver
was intended or effected." 39 In United States v. Elliott40 a government agent
appeared at defendant's house with an invalid warrant, but was admitted by
defendant who said, "'You don't need any warrant.' 41 Despite the defendant's apparent consent, the court held, "[o]rderly submission to law-enforcement officers who, in effect, represented to the defendant that they had the
authority to enter and search the house, against his will if necessary, was not
such consent as constituted an understanding, intentional and voluntary
waiver by the defendant .... ,,42
Because of the emphasis on the requirement of a search warrant and the relative weakness of consent, especially third party consent, the courts seem to find
coercion if the consent does not possess the strict requirements of voluntari34. Id. at 59. In State v. Matias, 451 P.2d 257 (Hawaii 1969), the court objected to
third party consents because "a third party consent is unreasonable and hence violative
of the spirit and meaning of the constitutional prohibition." Id. at 260.
35. E.g., Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1968) ; People v. Shepard, 212
Cal. App. 2d 697, 28 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn.

405, 135 N.W.2d 577 (1965); State v. Cook, 242 Ore. 490, 411 P.2d 78 (1966).
36. Such significant factors were outlined in Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d at 262.
These factors were: (1) voluntariness of the consent; (2) the premises were under the
third party's immediate and complete control; (3) the search did not extend to "personal
effects"; and (4) reasonableness of the search.
37. But cf. 41 St. John's L. Rev. 82, 90 (1966); 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 797, 812 (1966);
113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 260, 277 (1964).

38.

255 U.S. 313 (1921).

39. Id. at 317.
40.

210 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1962).

41.

Id. at 359.

42. Id. at 360. In Wilkerson v. State, 37 Okla. Crim. 43, 256 P. 63 (1927), the police
represented that they had a search warrant, as they did in the Overton case, but it also
was void. There the court refused to recognize the consent, holding, "[lit is well settled
that when officers, desiring to make a search of premises, inform the person in charge of
the premises that they had a search warrant, and such person then gives consent, it i
not a waiver of the unlawful character of the search . . . . ' Id. at 44, 256 P. at 63.
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ness.43 The Elliott court would in all probability find coercion present in all
cases where a third party consents after being informed that the police had a
warrant which subsequently proved to be invalid. 4 Other jurisdictions, however,
have reached different conclusions. In State v. Kindernan,45 a police officer went
to defendant's father's house, explained why he was there, told him he might find
the evidence for which he was looking, and explained that it was not necessary
that defendant's father give permission. The ambiguity of this statement was
noted by the court, but since defendant neither testified to being misled nor
noted the ambiguity, the court interpreted 47it in a light favorable to the government. 46 Kinderinanis not without support.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to draw a clearer distinction between
the voluntariness of consent and implied coercion in Bumper v. North Carolina. s There defendant was tried and convicted of rape. A rifle which was
introduced at the trial was obtained by a search of defendant's grandmother's
home, where he resided. Before defendant's arrest, four white law enforcement
officers went to the grandmother's house and announced to her, a Negro, that
they had a search warrant. The grandmother consented to the search. The
search warrant had never issued and the state, therefore, relied on Mrs. Leath's
consent to validate the search. The Supreme Court framed the issue in terms of
"whether a search can be justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that
'consent' has been given only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he possesses a warrant.1 49 Here the Court was concerned with implied coercion and not with the question of whether Mrs. Leath could, in fact,
consent.50 In deciding the question of coercion, the Court held that "[w] hen a
law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under warrant, he
announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The
situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there
is coercion there cannot be consent."51
43. 1967 Wash. U.L.Q. 12, 15.
44. Courts have often interpreted the facts of a case as they affect voluntariness in a
way favorable to the defendant, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Channel
v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Rutheiser, 203 F. Supp.
891 (SMDN.Y. 1962); Elmore v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 443, 138 S.W2d 956 (1940).
45. 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965).
46. Id. at 406-07 n.1, 136 N.W.2d at 578-79 n.1 which reads: "We construe [the

officer's] statement . . . to mean that the elder Kinderman had a right to deny him
admittance. We do not infer the officer was asserting a right to enter with or without
permission since Kinderman, Sr., did not take the stand to suggest he was in any way
misled, and no point is made of the ambiguity by defendant."
47. E.g., Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1965); Gray v. Commonwealth,
198 Ky. 610, 249 S.W. 769 (1923).
48. 391 US. 543 (1968).
49. Id. at 548.

50. However, the Court's notes indicate that the property right of control theory is
valid in that one with a superior right of control can consent for another to a search of
his property. See id. at 548 n.11, 556 n.4.
51. Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
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On the question of third party consent, New York decisions have turned
largely on the property right of control theory. In People v. Mosley5 2 the court
held that a third party may give consent if he occupies the premises searched
or has possession of the property seized. 3 New York has also made use of the
implied or apparent authority theory.5 4 However its courts have been extremely
conscious of the implied coercion created by the presence and demand of a
police officer to search. The District Court for the Southern District of New
York has held that consent based on misrepresentations is not valid55 and that
submission to authority "is not that consent which constitutes an unequivocal,
free and intelligent waiver of a fundamental right."''m The New York courts,
however, treat consent as a question of fact. 57 It is with this background that
Overton was originally decided. 8 However the Supreme Court subsequently
vacated the judgment and remanded it for further consideration in light of
Bumper.59 Upon rehearing the New York Court of Appeals distinguished
Bumper and reinstated its original decision. 0
The court of appeals emphasized that the vice-principal had a superior proprietory interest in the property involved. 61 In such third party consent cases
where a superior or equal right of control exists the tendency of the courts has
been to hold that a search of a person's personal effects is reasonable. 2'-' How52. 26 App. Div. 2d 668, 272 N.Y.S.2d 493 (2d Dep't 1966).
53. Id. at 669, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 494. See People v. Kortwright, 236 N.Y.S.2d 385
(Sup. Ct. 1962); People v. Sapienza, 51 Misc. 2d 786, 274 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Nassau County
Ct. 1966).
54. United States v. Heine, 149 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 885 (1945);
Hook v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 672, 181 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
55. Bolger v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 237, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd sub nonm. Bolger
v. Cleary, 293 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 392 (1963).
56. United States v. Gregory, 204 F. Supp. 884, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See People v.
Gonzalez, 50 Misc. 2d 508, 509, 270 N.Y.S.2d 727, 728 (App. T. 1966); People v. Saplenza,
51 Misc. 2d at 789, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
57. People v. Austin, 53 Misc. 2d 963, 964, 280 N.Y.S.2d 433, 435 (Nassau Dist. Ct. 1967);
People v. Kortwright, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 387. See also Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325, 336
(8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1962); People v.
Harvey, 48 Il. App. 2d 261, 265, 199 N.E.2d 236, 238 (1964); McCray v. State, 236 Md.9,
14, 202 A.2d 320, 322 (1964). See also State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 406-07 n.1,
136 N.W.2d 577, 578-79 n.1 (1965).
58. People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1969).
59. Overton v. New York, 393 U.S. 85 (1968).
60. People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969).
61. The New York Court of Appeals established this interest by stating, "in the City
of Mount Vernon [defendant's hometown], title to all school buildings and properties is
in the Board of Education. The administrators of the various schools operate them as
representatives of the owner. Dr. Panitz [the vice-principal] . . . is that representative
in the Mount Vernon High School. Under his direction and supervision, desks and lockers
are assigned to students for their use, under predetermined conditions, one of which prohibits the storage of material which violates the law." Id. at 525, 249 N.E.2d at 368, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 481-82. The vice-principal was thus the authorized agent of the property
owner and, as such, it was reasonable for him to consent.
62. See, e.g., cases cited notes 29 & 30 supra.
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ever, where the defendant's possession is exclusive, a third party's consent is
usually held to be unreasonable.0 3 Thus, in United States v. Blok, 0 ' the consent
of an employer to the search of an employee's desk was held invalid, the court
saying, "[A]ppellee's exclusive right to use the desk assigned to her made the
search of it unreasonable."6 5 The search in Overton, however, can be distinguished from such intrusions into personal effects. Not only did Dr. Panitz have
a superior proprietory interest, but he had the apparent authority to consent.cG
But, perhaps most important, the consent resulted in a reasonablesearch in that
the search of student lockers for marijuana is a safeguard for the school community as a whole.6 7 Thus the non-exclusive nature of defendant's possession,
the superior proprietory right, and the apparent authority of the vice-principal
to search contributed to the reasonableness of the search.
The major conflict occurs, however, in the area of implied coercion. The trial
court in Bumper had found Mrs. Leath's consent to be voluntary and free of
coercion. 68 Mr. Justice Black, in a strong dissent, agreed with the trial court.
He felt that Mrs. Leath's testimony showed a voluntary consent to the search
and objected to the majority's overruling the trial judge's findings.09 However,
the majority found Mrs. Leath's testimony to be contradictory. 70 Because of
this the Court looked again at the entire sequence of events and found Mrs.
Leath to have consented in a coercive atmosphere. 7' However, the Court does
63. E.g., Cunningham v. Heinze, 352 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
968 (1966); Reeves v. Warden, 346 F2d 915, 924-25 (4th Cir. 1965); Holzhey v. United
States, 223 F.2d 823, 826 (5th Cir. 1955).
64. 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
65. Id. at 1021.
66. In the original Overton decision the court expressed this by saying, "the students
at Mount Vernon are well aware that the school authorities possess the combinations of
their lockers. It appears understood that the lock and the combination are provided in
order that each student may have exclusive possession of the locker vis-.-vis other students,
but the student does not have such exclusivity over the locker as against the school authorities." 20 N.Y.2d at 363, 229 N.E.2d at 598, 283 N.YS.2d at 25.
67. The court in the prior Overton decision discussed the susceptibility of students at
the high school level to suggestion of antisocial bchavior. The parents of these children
"have a right to expect certain safeguards" by school officials. Id. at 362, 229 N.E.2d at
597, 283 N.YS.2d at 24.
68. 391 U.S. at 548 n.9. See note 55 supra.
69. 391 U.S. at 557 (Black, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 547 n.8. This footnote reads in part, "Et]he transcript of the suppression
hearing comes to us from North Carolina in the form of a narrative; i.e., the actual questions and answers have been rewritten in the form of continuous first person testimony.
The effect is to put into the mouth of the witness some of the words of the attorneys.
In the cases of an obviously compliant witness like Mrs. Leath, the result is a narrative
that has the tone of decisiveness but is shot through with contradictions. ' Id. (emphasis
deleted).
71. The contradiction in Mrs. Leath's testimony involved her attitude toward the police.
At one point she testified, "'He [the police officer] said he was the law and had a search
warrant to search the house, why I thought he could go ahead. I believed he had a search
warrant. I took him at his word ... .'" Id. at 547. At another point she testified, "'I had
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not seem to be going so far as to preclude all testimony relating to consent.
The Court sustained the general rule that the prosecution has the burden of
proving the voluntariness of consent and cannot discharge this burden by
showing no more than submission to authority. 72 There is thus an inference of
coercion. The Court's concern with the true meaning of Mrs. Leath's testimony
and its reiteration of the principle that the government has the burden of
proving consent leads one to believe that testimony regarding the consent would
be admissible but would have to be of an extraordinarily clear and convincing
nature to override this strong inference.
The New York Court of Appeals felt that such testimony was present in
Overton. The vice-principal, Dr. Panitz, was in charge of the high school and
had the duty of enforcing its rules and regulations. At the trial Dr. Panitz testified, "'Being responsible for the order, assignment, and maintenance of the
physical facilities, if any report were given to me by anyone of an article or
item of the nature that does not belong there, or of an illegal nature, I would
inspect the locker.' "73 In fact, what Dr. Panitz did was perform a duty delegated
to him by the Mount Vernon Board of Education.7 4 The implied coercion of a
search warrant with which the Supreme Court in Bumper was concerned cannot
be found where a public official is performing a duty. In such a situation
"[c] oercion is absent ..
75

.

having been displaced by the performance of a dele-

gated duty."
The dissent based its objections on the fact that Dr. Panitz testified he was
honoring the search warrant in permitting the search. 70 Hence, "if the bad
search warrant played an effective role in the invasion of defendant's privacy,
the result is unlawful even though the vice-principal also gave his 'consent'
to the search and had a general authority in the school premises."7 7 However,
the vice-principal had the duty of inspecting defendant's locker and it is not
inconsistent to say he voluntarily consented
to the search while at the same
time "honoring" an invalid warrant. 78
New York thus seems to be putting a necessary limit on the interpretation of
Bumper. There is obviously a vast difference between the consent of an educated, intelligent school official in the face of police authority and that of an
illiterate grandmother confronted in her backwoods home with the presence of
four armed law enforcement officials. To say that the former does not have the
ability to consent because his consent is necessarily coerced, regardless of later
no objection to them making a search of my house. . . . I let them search, and it was
all my own free will. Nobody forced me at all.'" Id. at 547 n.8.
72. Id. at 548-49.
73. 24 N.Y.2d at 526, 249 N.E.2d at 368, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 482 (emphasis added).

74. See note 58 supra.
75. 24 N.Y.2d at 526, 249 N.E.2d at 368, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
76. Id. at 527, 249 N.E.2d at 369, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 483 (dissenting opinion).
77. Id.
78. In other words, Dr. Panitz freely consented to the search and would have done
so regardless of who informed him of the probability of marijuana being in the locker
(see note 67 supra) as it was his duty. Yet, at the same time, he was honoring the authority
of the police although it played no part in his decision.
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testimony and surrounding facts, is to put a deterrent on police effectiveness
which could not possibly have been forseen by the Court in Bumper.
Thus Bumper stands for the proposition that the showing of an invalid search
warrant will normally render a subsequent consent invalid because of the inherent coerciveness of the warrant. Overton is the limited exception where the
evidence of free and voluntary consent, unaffected by the coercive effect of the
warrant, is so strong that the overwhelming inference of coercion is overridden.
Any other interpretation would go far towards destroying in every instance
the effect of consent as a waiver of the protections of the fourth amendment.

Criminal Procedure-Self-Incrimination-Witness Who Voluntarily Testified Before the Grand Jury Waived His Privilege Against Seif-Incrimixnation for Purposes of Trial at Which He Was Not a Defendant.Government's witness, after voluntarily testifying before the grand jury which
indicted the defendants for arson and possession of dangerous weapons, refused
to testify at the subsequent trial, claiming his privilege against self-incrimination.
The witness was an accomplice of the accused, and had not been granted immunity from prosecution. However, the trial judge overruled his claim of privilege and ordered the witness to testify, and the defendants were subsequently
convicted. The court of appeals, although it found that the trial judge had erred
in his reasons for compelling the witness to testify,' and furthermore that the
79. That the Overton decision is a limited exception is evidenced by a subsequent New
York holding. In People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Nassau Dist. Ct. 196S),
a college official who had implied authority to enter dormitory rooms was held to be
unable to consent to a search by police. This case might be more analogous to the landlordtenant cases than to Overton. However, it suggests that New York still holds the individual's
rights protected by the fourth amendment to be superior to any purely proprietory right.
The proprietory right in Overton was combined with a reasonable consent and resulted
in a reasonable search.
1. The trial judge rejected the contention of the prosecutor that the witness' waiver of
the privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury carried over to the defendants'
trial, but he nevertheless overruled the witness' claim of privilege and ordered him to
testify on the ground that Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), protected
the witness from the subsequent use of his testimony against him. In Murphy, petitioners
had been held in contempt for refusing to testify before a state investigatory commis on.
They contended that, although granted immunity under a state statute, their answers
might tend to incriminate them by revealing federal offenses against which they had not
been immunized. In other words, the petitioners argued that the immunity granted them
from prosecution by state officials was not "co-extensive" with their constitutional privilege.
See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The Court, however, held that
the petitioners could be compelled to answer, since the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination prohibited federal officials from making use of the testimony or its fruits.
378 U.S. at 77-80. judge Leventhal, author of the Ellis opinion, distinguished Murphy by
finding that while in Murphy the order to testify was preceded by a grant of immunity
pursuant to statute, there was no such statute utilized in the present litigation, but
simply an order that erroneously overruled a witness' claim of privilege. Ellis v. United
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defendants had standing to raise the issue on appeal, 2 nevertheless affirmed the
defendants' convictions, holding that the witness' waiver of the privilege against
States, 416 F.2d 791, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Nevertheless, Judge Leventhal held that the
witness was protected by "the approach and principle underlying Murphy" (Id.),
citing in support of this statement Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (forfeitureof-office statute induced police officers to forgo reliance on the privilege against selfincrimination and rendered the resulting statements involuntary and inadmissible in state
criminal proceedings); Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954) ("[A] witness does
not need any statute to protect him from the use of self-incriminating testimony he is
compelled to give over his objection.") ; and 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2270, at 417 (3d ed.
1961) (an erroneous overruling of the claim of privilege will render the testimony inadmissible against the witness in any subsequent proceeding). Thus, Judge Leventhal in effect
agreed with the trial judge that the witness was protected under the Murphy rule, even
in the absence of an immunity statute. He found, however, that the result of the trial
judge's erroneously compelling a witness to testify would in effect grant immunity to the
witness-an unjustified result-since this would mean that a judge could independently,
without statutory authority, confer immunity upon a witness. Judge Leventhal correctly
pointed out that Congress has restricted the power to grant immunity to a limited group
of federal officials, and, therefore, it was outside the scope of judicial authority for the
trial judge to grant immunity by the circular method of compelling the witness to testify
and thereby making him immune under the Murphy doctrine. 416 F.2d at 795. Despite
the validity of this reliance upon the Murphy rule by both Judge Leventhal and the
trial judge, such reliance might well have been unnecessary in view of the fact that any
erroneous overruling of a witness' privilege against self-incrimination may be said to result
in a coerced confession which would then be inadmissible in any subsequent prosecution of
that witness. See generally Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Judge Danaher dissented
from this part of the decision. He found that the trial judge correctly interpreted the
scope of the Murphy decision in balancing the public's interest in the truth regarding the
defendants guilt or innocence against their rights. 416 F.2d 807. Judge Wright, while dissenting from the affirmance, joined in Judge Leventhal's reasoning concerning the issue of
judicial compulsion of privileged testimony. Id. at 808.
2. The general rule is that the privilege against self-incrimination is a perional right
and as such cannot he asserted by a third party. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367 (1951) ; Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942); Hudson v. United States,
197 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Ziegler v. United States, 174 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 822 (1949); United States v. Steffen, 103 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Cal. 1951). Thus, a
defendant generally has no standing to complain of an erroneous ruling by a trial judge
regarding the scope of a witness' privilege. See, e.g., Long v. United States, 360 F.2d 829,
834 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Bowman v. United States, 350 F.2d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966); Note, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 686, 692 (1930). While Judge
Leventhal recognized these basic rules, 416 F.2d at 495, he found that it would have
been unrealistic to expect the witness to raise the issue on appeal, since the trial judge
and the Ellis court had decided that the Murphy rationale provided the witness immunity
from prosecution based on his incriminating statements. While conceding that in an exceptional situation a witness whom the trial judge had erroneously compelled to testify might
risk contempt and appeal such a ruling, rather than testify under the immunity offered,
Judge Leventhal found that the defendants should be given standing to appeal since the
trial judge's error would have been realistically foreclosed from review. Judge Leventhal
relied on Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), for the proposition that the rule against granting standing to parties to
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self-incrimination at the grand jury hearing carried over to the trial at which
he was not a defendant. Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

The general rule concerning the waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination is that the witness waives his privilege only with respect to the particular
proceeding at which he volunteers to testify. 3 The basis for this general rule may
be extracted from two early Virginia decisions. In Cullen v. Commonwealth' it
was held that a witness who voluntarily testified at a coroner's inquest did not
waive his privilege against self-incrimination for purposes of a subsequent grand
jury hearing. Similarly, in Temple v. Commonwealth, a witness who voluntarily
testified before a grand jury was held not to have waived his privilege at the
trial of the indicted party. The overwhelming majority of decisions, in both
state and federal courts, are in accord with the rule enunciated in these two
cases. 6 Only a minority of jurisdictions have held that a waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination carried over from one hearing to another. 7
raise the rights of others was subject to significant exceptions. In Barrows, it was found
that a white defendant who had been a party to a racially restrictive covenant and who
was subsequently sued by the covenantors because she had conveyed her property to
Negroes, had standing to raise the issue of whether enforcement of the covenant violated
the rights of prospective Negro purchasers to equal protection. In Griswold, it was held
that the director of the Planned Parenthood League and a licensed physician had standing
to assert the constitutional rights of married persons with whom they had maintained a
professional relationship. The argument in favor of granting standing would certainly have
been more convincing had the ultimate decision been for reversal. In order to justify a
departure from the general rule on standing, some "fundamental" right of the party seeking
to assert the privilege of another would have to be violated if the court did not permit
review. Thus, the Supreme Court in Barrows found the standing rule to be outweighed by
the "need to protect the fundamental rights" of the party raising the issue. 346 U.S. at
257. In Ellis, however, if some fundamental right of the defendants had been violated
by the trial judge's compulsion of the witness's testimony, it would seem that the result
would have been a reversal of their convictions. Judge Danaher, concurring in the affirmance, would not have granted the appellants standing, following the general rule. 416
F2d at 807. Judge Wright, dissenting from the affirmance, of course agreed with Judge
Leventhal that the defendants had standing. Id. at 808.
3. C. McCormick, Evidence § 130, at 274 (1954); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2276, at
470 (3d ed. 1961).
4. 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 624 (1873).
5. 75 Va. 892 (1881).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958) ; In re Neff, 206 F.2d
149 (3d Cir. 1953); Poretto v. United States, 196 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1952) ; United States
v. Vadner, 119 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1954); United States v. Malone, 111 F. Supp. 37
(N.D. Cal. 1953); Overend v. Superior Ct., 131 Cal. 280, 63 P. 372 (1900); People v.
Walker, 28 Ill. 2d 585, 192 N.E.2d 819 (1963); Samuel v. People, 164 Ill. 379, 45 N.E. 728
(1896); Duckworth v. District Ct., 220 Iowa 1350, 264 N.N. 715 (1936); Apodaca v.
Viramontes, 53 N.M. 514, 212 P.2d 425 (1949); People v. Cassidy, 213 N.Y. 388, 107 N.E.
713 (1915); Hummell v. Superior Ct., 100 R.I. 54, 211 A.2d 272 (1965); Miskimins v.

Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411 (1899). See also Note, 73 Dick. L. Rev. 80 (1968).
7.

See State v. Burrel, 27 Mont. 282, 70 P. 982 (1902), aff'd, 194 U.S. 572 (1904). In

this decision it was held that a bankrupt who waived the privilege against self-incrimination
by testifying before a referee was precluded from objecting to cross-examination in a
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Nevertheless, in spite of its widespread acceptance, the waiver limitation has
been criticized, 8 and it is the reasoning of its critics that the Ellis court adopted.,
The court found that since the "paramount interest" protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination is "the right to remain silent rather than make disclosures that may in fact lead to prosecution,"' 0 once a witness has voluntarily
testified, he should not be allowed to reclaim the privilege at a subsequent proceeding, so long as he is not compelled to disclose new incriminating evidence."
Thus, the court noted with approval the waiver rule2 proposed in the Model
Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
The Ellis opinion considered four arguments frequently advanced that favor
retention of the prevailing rule that a waiver is not carried over from a prior to a
subsequent proceeding. The first was that it has been the policy of the courts to
protect the witness' privilege, and not to lightly assume a waiver. 13 In response,
the court pointed out: "The Supreme Court has plainly tried to strike a balance
between the policy of the privilege and the requirement for information." 4
While the court admitted that the balance is usually weighted heavily in favor
of the privilege, 15 it contended that some danger of "legal harm" must exist
subsequent criminal case concerning incriminating admissions made in that testimony. In
State v. Fary, 19 NJ. 431, 440, 117 A.2d 499, 504-05 (1955) the court concluded: "[hiere
the appellants did not claim the privilege when testifying before the first grand jury, and
it is not suggested that different questions were asked at the second inquest. In that circum.
stance, a waiver barring their right to assert the privilege at the second inquiry may be
constructed."
8. C. McCormick, Evidence § 130, at 274 (1954): "A mechanical limitation has been
placed upon the application of this doctrine of waiver. This limitation Is calculated to
encourage culprits to bribe and intimidate witnesses against them to change their testimony.
This is the restriction that the waiver by disclosure of incriminating facts is strictly confined
in effect to the very proceedings in which the first testimony is given. . . .The rule...
protects chiefly the person accused of crime, and gives very little protection to the witness.
If be has already given material evidence of his own guilt, such evidence, in the form of
a transcript of his testimony, or of a signed affidavit, can readily be proved against him If
he is tried for the crime. The present testimony will not add to his hazard except as
additional facts or details are brought out." (footnotes deleted).
9. 416 F.2d at 800.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 801. See note 27 infra.
12. 416 F.2d at 801. Model Code of Evidence rule 231 (1942); Uniform Rules of Evidence rule 37: A person who would otherwise have a privilege to refuse to disclose or to
prevent another from disclosing a specified matter has no such privilege with respect to that
matter if the judge finds that he or any other person while the holder of the privilege has:
(b) without coercion and with knowledge of his privilege, made disclosure of any part
of the matter or consented to such a disclosure made by any one." This rule, of course,
would include a waiver given at such previous hearings as a coroner's inquest, bankruptcy
proceedings, prior trial, and, as in Ellis, a grand jury hearing.
13. See Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949) ; Poretto v. United States, 196
F.2d 392, 394 (5th Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Hoag, 142 F.Supp. 667, 673 (D.D.C. 1956).
14. 416 F.2d at 802.
15. Id. On the liberality with which the Supreme Court has construed the priv.
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before the privilege can be invoked. 1' Since the witness has already incriminated
himself where he has voluntarily testified at a prior proceeding, his present testimony concerning the same facts can do him no further harm. 17
The second argument invoked against a broadening of the waiver rule is that
the repetition of incriminating testimony may serve to add credibility to such
testimony, and therefore be more incriminating. 18 However, as the court responded: "If reiteration alone is sufficient for realistic new incrimination that
would also prohibit a subsequent appearance before the same tribunal, and that
plainly is not the law."'19 Thus, the court found that the mere repetition of incriminating evidence could not be more incriminating.
The third argument, adopted by the Ellis dissent,2 0 involved particularly the
question of waiver before a grand jury. Since the grand jury is a secret hearing,
while a trial is public, it was contended that a witness should be allowed to
reclaim his privilege at the trial, since he may choose to waive his right to remain
silent in private, but may choose not to do so in public. 2 At least one other
federal court has adopted this reasoning.22 The majority, however, stated in
rejoinder that this "privacy interest ...is not the crucial interest [with regard
to the privilege against self-incrimination], for it does not survive to protect the
privilege once the fear of prosecution is gone, as in case of granted immunity."23
ilege against self-incrimination see, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 US. 273, 276 (196S);
Albertson v. SA.C.B., 382 U.S. 70, 81 (1965); Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
16. 416 F.2d at 802.
17. Id. at 801. The court extracted this idea from Rogers v. United States, 340 US.
367 (1951), where the Supreme Court held that a witness who had waived his privilege
could not refuse to answer further questions at the same hearing concerning identical
matter which would not further incriminate him. In order for a witness to claim the
privilege, Ellis found that Rogers required that there exist "a real danger of legal detriment," 340 U.S. at 373, and that there was no such "legal detriment" to a witness in
merely repeating the incriminating statement he had previously made before the grand jury.
18. See United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 19S8); United States v.
Steffen, 103 F. Supp. 415, 417 (N.D.Cal. 1951).
19. 416 F.2d at 802; see Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); note 17 supra.
See also United States v. Hoag, 142 F. Supp. 667 (D.D.C. 1956); United States v. Willis,
145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955); United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Pa.
1947).
20. 416 F.2d at 808.
21. judge Wright, in the Ellis dissent, argued that the "Fifth Amendment . .. establishes
a right to abstain from the demeaning ritual of public self-accusation." Id. He
found support for such a position in justice Douglas' statement in Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 440 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
22. See In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 1953): "The grand jury is not a judidal
tribunal but rather an informing or accusing body. While an appendage of the court it
does not conduct its proceedings judicially and when after its secret ex parte investigation
it finds and returns to the court an indictment against a defendant its function with
respect to that defendant is ended. It is clear, therefore, that the investigation of a grand
jury is a proceeding which is wholly separate and distinct from, and of a different nature
than, the subsequent trial of the defendant in the district court."
23. 416 F.2d at 802 (footnotes deleted).
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The fourth argument that the court rejected was that it was possible that a
witness who voluntarily testified at the prior judicial proceeding might have a
cogent reason for refusing to repeat such testimony at the subsequent hearing. It was therefore contended that a witness should always be permitted to
claim the privilege at a subsequent hearing, since in the interval between it and
the prior hearing, it was always possible that "new material" or "new conditions" 24 could arise, such as the passage of new criminal statutes, which could
materially change the position of the witness and cause his answers to be more
incriminating.25 While recognizing the validity of this argument, 20 the court
found that such facts are extraordinary and therefore should merely be treated
as exceptions to the rule that the waiver should carry over from one proceeding
27
to another.
Proponents of a change in the waiver doctrine have criticized it as a "mechanical" rule which serves primarily to protect the defendant and not the witness, who is the intended beneficiary of the privilege's protection. 28 If a witness,
who cooperated by testifying before a grand jury, refused to testify at the trial,
the prosecution's case may be destroyed and the public interest suffer. Thus,
proponents of change argue that "the force of the machinery of government once
set in motion should not be nullified by permitting a witness to withhold essential testimony." 29 Advocates of a change also point to the danger that a claim
of privilege may be spurious, since all that is required is that it be evident
from the implications of the question and the setting in which it is asked that
to reply could result in injury to the witness.30 While obviously the danger that
the claim of privilege might be spurious is always present, that danger would
certainly be greater in a situation where the witness sought to reclaim the privilege in a context apparently of no benefit to himself, but only to the defendant.9 1
24. Id. at 805.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958); In re Neff, 206
F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953).
26. 416 F.2d at 805.
27. Ellis distinguished many of the cases which appear contrary to its holding on the

ground that, in light of the particular circumstances in those cases, to require tho witness
to answer would have meant compelling him to disclose new incriminating evidence. Thus,
the court distinguished In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953), since in this case there
was a conviction of the witness for perjury in the time between the grand jury investigation and the trial. The court found that such a conviction could constitute a "new condition," and thereby cut off the waiver. Such "new material" or "new conditions" might
also come about as a result of a long time lapse between hearings, since such a time
lapse could result in the passage of new criminal laws creating new grounds for the witness
to apprehend that his answers might be self-incriminating. See United States v. Miranti,
253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958). The Ellis court found that only where such "new material"
or "new conditions" can be shown to exist should the waiver of the privilege against selfincrimination be held inapplicable. See 416 F.2d at 805.
28. See C. McCormick, Evidence § 130, at 274 (1954); see note 8 supra.
29. 32 III. L. Rev. 117, 118 (1937).
30. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
31. See State v. De Cola, 33 N.J. 335, 164 A.2d 729 (1960). While the New Jersey
Supreme Court chose to follow the established rule against finding a waiver, the court
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While Ellis recognized that the interest which the community has in law enforcement cannot be used to justify "trampling on the Constitution,' 3 2 the court
found that such an interest should be taken into account in determining the
scope of constitutional protections, and that such protections, "are not to be
extended by 'mechanical rules' that serve no meaningful freedom, but interfere
with and hamper sound law enforcement.1 33 Thus, the court proposed a balancing test to cope with the assertion of a personal privilege, and it found that
in the present context, contrary to the normal situation, the balance weighed
heavily against the granting of such a right. Surely, if justice is to be measured
3
on a scale balancing freedom against security, as the court indicated it must, 1
then regardless of the degree to which the scale is tilted in favor of individual
freedom, there must be some counterweight that will tip it in favor of security.
The court found such a counterweight in the "community's interest in law enforcement" when the individual privilege serves "no meaningful freedom."35
However, Ellis emphasized that its decision would not apply where the witness
himself was the accused or was under indictment,3 0 nor would it apply when an
answer would require disclosure of new incriminating evidence. 37 Thus, in
disallowing a valueless claim of the privilege against self-incrimination, the
court sought to promote justice while protecting individual rights by substantially decreasing the possibility that by means of threats or bribes a guilty defendant would be able to destroy the case against him. Thus, Ellis, has attempted
to correct a procedural rule which has often served only to enable disreputable
individuals to pervert a valuable constitutional right.

Domestic Relations-Return of An Engagement Ring Given By a Married
Man.-Plaintiff, a married man living apart from his wife and contemplating
divorce, presented defendant with an engagement ring1 upon her promise to
marry him. Plaintiff alleged that the promises of both parties were conditioned
on his success at obtaining a divorce. Defendant broke the engagement but
failed to return the ring. Plaintiff sued for restitution of the ring and defendant
voiced the concern of the rule's critics: "The problem is confounded by the thought that
the claim of privilege may be spurious; that because of bribe, threat, or a purpose to favor
another, a witness who speaks before a grand jury may later assert the privilege to cloak
nothing but a refusal "to repeat the truth. To anyone familiar with the knavery in this
area, the fear is not academic. And the greater the original insult to the public, the greater
will be the inducement to 'persuade' the witness to seek the sanctuary of a fabricated
claim." Id. at 447, 164 A.2d at 736.
32. 416 F2d at 801.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35.

Id.

36. Id. at 802.
37. Id.
1. The ring involved was ten and one-half carats and valued at sixty thousand dollars.
Lowe v. Quinn, 32 App. Div. 2d 269, 271, 301 N.Y..2d 361, 364 (1st Dep't 1969).
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appealed from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term which denied her
motion for a summary judgment. The appellate division ruled that section 80-b
of the Civil Rights Law2 had removed the bar to an action for recovery of an
engagement ring which was imposed by the Civil Practice Act of 1935.3 The
court reversed the order, however, with one dissent, on the grounds that a gift
can not be conditioned on a contract which is void as against public policy, i.e.,
married individuals can not enter into a contract to marry another; the gift was
absolute. Lowe v. Quinn, 32 App. Div. 2d 269, 301 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep't
1969).
The rights of the parties in an engagement ring upon the failure of the anticipated marriage to occur has an interesting and somewhat confused history under
New York law. The common law was based upon the responsibility for the
termination of the engagement. 4 When the termination was due to the gentleman's reluctance, caused by no fault of the lady, the ring remained the property of the lady. 5 If, however, the lady caused the termination, the ring was to
be returned, 6 as it was if the termination was mutual-'
Although the courts had little difficulty determining the result to be reached,
there was great confusion as to the theory upon which to base the decisions.
Earlier cases rested on a pledge theory, taking the position that absolute ownership of the ring did not pass until the marriage occurred, or until the donor
caused its failure to occur, thus forfeiting the pledge.8 The pledge theory was
based on the significance of the ring and was not extended to allow recovery of
other engagement gifts. One New York case allowed recovery where the engagement was mutually rescinded on the theory that the ring was consideration and
that the parties should be returned to the status quo. 9 It is improbable, however, that the donor intends the ring as consideration for a promise to marry. 10
2. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 80-b (Supp. 1969).
3. Laws of N.Y., 1935, cb. 263, art. 2-A.
4. Roman law imposed no penalties for a broken engagement but the betrothal gifts
(arrae sponsalitiae) were to be returned if the engagement had been mutually dissolved or
if the gifts had been received by the party at fault. English common law developed as a
response to a social oddity in England, a constant shortage of men. The fear of spinisterhood caused a strictness in enforcing promises to marry. See generaly 2 C. Sherman, Roman
Law in the Modern World 45 (1924); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 576, 582 (1952); Cohen v. Sellar,
[1926] 1 K.B. 536.
5. Beer v. Hart, 153 Misc. 277, 274 N.Y.S. 671 (Mun. Ct. 1934).
6. Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 262 N.Y.S. 716 (1st Dep't 1933) ; for cases involving antenuptial gifts other than rings see Antaramian v. Ourakian, 118 Misc. 558, 194 N.Y.S.
100 (App. T. 1922); Cushing v. Hughes, 119 Misc. 39, 195 N.Y.S. 200 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
7. Wilson v. Riggs, 243 App. Div. 33, 276 N.Y.S. 232 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd mem., 267
N.Y. 570, 196 N.E. 584 (1935).
8. Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 730-31, 262 N.Y.S. 716, 718 (1st Dep't 1933);
Jacobs v. Davis, [1917] 2 K.B. 532, 533.
9. Unger v. Hirsch, 180 Misc. 381, 39 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943).
10. See Note, Quasi-contract: Gifts: Effect of New York anti-heart balm statute, 29
Cornell L.Q. 401, 402 (1944) [hereinafter cited as 29 Cornell L.Q.]. Contra as to other antenuptial gifts, Antaramian v. Ourakian, 118 Misc. 558, 194 N.Y.S. 100 (App. T. 1922).
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One court allowed plaintiff to proceed on a theory of a quasi-contractual recovery to prevent unjust enrichment.11 In one very unusual case the plaintiff
2
was allowed a recovery on a theory of bailment.'
The most popular theory is that an engagement ring is a conditional gift,"a

dependent upon a condition subsequent. 1 4 The ring, when transferred, becomes
tfie property of the donee subject to the occurrence of the condition. However,
the cases demonstrate that confusion exists as to the exact nature of the con-

dition. The courts have used various terms, e.g., "breach of the marriage engage-

ment,"

5

"breach the contract,"'16 "if the parties did not wed,"' 17 and similar

phrases to describe the condition upon which the gift depends. Normally, distinctions might be merely an exercise in semantics, but in several instances the

consequences are important, e.g., if the parties mutually rescind the contract to
marry, there is no breach and yet a recovery is allowed on a conditional gift

theory.' 8 The proper interpretation would seem to be that the condition attached to the gift is the failure of the marriage to occur without any fault of
the donor.
In 1935, the New York legislature decided that public policy favored the
abolition of the remedies previously available for breach of promise to marry
due to the "grave abuses" of such causes of action,' 0 and enacted article 2-A of
the Civil Practice Act, which said in part, "[t] he rights of action heretofore existing to recover sums of money as damage for. . . breach of contract to marry
are hereby abolished.112 0 "No contract to marry... shall operate to give rise ...
to any cause or right of action for the breach thereof." 2' 1 The engagement ring
cases decided in the years subsequent to the enactment of article 2-A relied
upon the earlier case law without mention of any statutory change.- In Andie
v. Kaplan,m the plaintiff gave defendant a ring and other gifts "in connection
with a mutual promise of marriage" and brought an action to recover them.
For the first time the appellate division affirmed a dismissal on the grounds that
11. Zawadzki v. Vandetti, 255 App. Div. 932, 9 N.Y.S.2d 219 (4th Dep't 1938). Such a
recovery theory was urged in 29 Cornell L.Q.
12. Benedict v. Flannery, 115 Misc. 627, 189 N.Y.S. 104 (App. T. 1921).
13. Wilson v. Riggs, 243 App. Div. 33, 34, 276 N.Y.S. 232-33 (1st Dep't 1934); Beck v.

Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 262 N.Y.S. 716 (Ist Dep't 1933). "That it is a conditional gift
seems inherent in its very purpose." Id. at 730, 262 N.Y.S. at 718; Beer v. Hart, 153 Misc.
277, 278, 274 N.Y.S. 671, 672 (Mun. Ct. 1934) ; Jacobs v. Davis, [1917] 2 K.B. 532, 533.

14. Wilson v. Riggs, 243 App. Div. 33, 34, 276 N.Y.S. 232 (1st Dep't 1934); Annot., 24
A.L.R.2d 576, 589 (1952).
15. Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 731, 262 N.Y.S. 716, 718 (1st Dep't 1933).
16. Id. at 732, 262 N.Y.S. at 720.

17. Wilson v. Riggs, 243 App. Div. 33, 34, 276 N.Y.S. 232 (Ist Dep't 1934).
18. Id.
19. Laws of N.Y., 1935, ch. 263, art. 2-A, § 61-a.
20. Id. § 61-b.
21. Id. § 61-d.
22. Zawadzki v. Vandetti, 255 App. Div. 932, 9 N.Y.S.2d 219 (4th Dep't 1938) (dissent
believes statute is applicable); Hutchinson v. Kernitzky, 23 N.YS.2d 650 (App. T. 1940).
23. 263 App. Div. 884, 32 N.Y.S.2d 429 (2d Dep't 1942).

PORDHAM LAW REVIEW

362

[Vol. 38

such an action was barred by article 2-A. Two justices dissented because they
2
did not believe such a case was within the spirit of the legislative prohibition. 4
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed without an opinion 25 and followed
the decision in a later case.26 In most subsequent cases it became impossible for
of his fault or lack of it in
a man to reclaim an engagement gift regardless
27
causing the failure of the marriage to occur.
Criticism of these decisions was widespread. 28 Some lower courts attempted
to circumvent the issue through alternative theories. 29 In 1947, the legislature
passed a bill which would have allowed recovery of an engagement ring in certain circumstances.3 0 However, the bill was vetoed by the Governor.3 1
Sections 61-b and 61-d of the Civil Practice Act were incorporated into section 80 of the Civil Rights Law in 1962, and the new statute was amended in
1965 by section
80-b to allow recovery of engagement rings when "justice so
32
requires.1

In Goldstein v. Rosenthal,33 the only case reported since the enactment of
section 80-b and prior to Lowe, the court looked to the law before the enactment of article 2-A and, basing its decision on Beck v. Cohen,3 4 awarded plaintiff the return of the engagement ring or its value3 The result is that New
York now allows the recovery of an engagement ring if such a recovery was
allowed under common law.
The jurisdictions which do not have applicable statutes generally reach the
same results as did the New York courts prior to the Andie decision.3 0 Only one
24. Id.
25. 288 N.Y. 685, 43 N.E.2d 82 (1942).
26. Josephson v. Dry Dock Say. Inst., 292 N.Y. 666, 56 N.E.2d 96 (1944).

27. Morris v. Baird, 269 App. Div. 948, 57 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d Dep't 1945); Hecht v.
Yarnis, 268 App. Div. 771, 50 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st Dep't 1944).
28. See Note, Domestic Relations: The Heart Balm Act and Ante-Nuptial Gifts, 13
Brooklyn L. Rev. 174 (1947); Note, Breach of Contract to Marry: New York Civil Practice
Act Article 2-A: Recovery of Antenuptial Gifts, 48 Cornell L.Q. 186 (1962); 29 Cornell

L.Q.
29. Unger v. Hirsch, 180 Misc. 381, 39 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. City Ct. 1943); accord,
Spitz v. Maxwell, 186 Misc. 159, 59 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
30. Proposed amendment to the Civil Practice Act § 61-j: "This article shall not be
deemed to prevent a court in a proper case from granting restitution for property or money
transferred in contemplation of the performance of an agreement to marry which is not
performed." 1947 Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 227; 1947 Leg. Doc. No. 65(J).
31. 1947 Public Papers of Thomas E. Dewey at 286.
32. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 80-b (Supp. 1969): "Nothing in this article contained shall
be construed to bar a right of action for the recovery of a chattel ... when the sole consideration for the transfer of the chattel . . . was a contemplated marriage which has not
occurred . . . ." Id.

33.
34.
35.
1968).
36.

56 Misc. 2d 311, 288 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Civil Ct. of City of N.Y. 1968).
237 App. Div. 729, 262 N.Y.S. 716 (1st Dep't 1933).
Goldstein v. Rosenthal, 56 Misc. 2d 311, 288 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Civil Ct. of City of N.Y.
E.g., Schultz v. Duitz, 253 Ky. 135, 69 S.W.2d 27 (1934); Ruchling v. Hornung, 98
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case has held that the donor may recover the ring regardless of which party
breaks the engagement. 37 Most states proceed upon the theory that the ring is
a conditional gift 38 and is to be returned if the engagement is dissolved by
40
agreement3 9 or if the donee unjustifiably breaks the engagement.
A few states have enacted statutes which determine the property rights in the
42
4
engagement ring upon the dissolution of the engagement. ' Fifteen states
other than New York have statutes similar to section 80-a of the Civil Rights
Law, but only the Pennsylvania act has been extended to bar an action to
recover an engagement ring.43 Four other states have construed their statutes

as not barring such a recovery."
Unlike the cases described above, the plaintiff in Lowc was a married man,
living apart from his wife, at the time that he gave the defendant the engagement ring. Under common law, a contract to marry was against public policy
if one of the participants was married to another and such an attempt to contract was void.4 5 The reasoning behind such a policy is that a man (or woman)
who is presently married does not enjoy the right to contract to a future marriage.46 Such a contract being void, there could be no suit for breach of promise
based upon the contract.

47

The majority opinion in Lowe v. Quinn reaffirms the position stated in GoldPa. Super. 535 (1929); Shaw v. Christie, 160 S.W.2d 989 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Cohen v.
Sellar, [19261 1 K.B. 536; Jacobs v. Davis, [19171 2 K.B. 532.
37. Albanese v. Indelicato, 25 N.J. Misc. 144, 51 A.2d 110 (Dist. Ct. of Jersey City
1947).
38. Ruehuing v. Hornung, 98 Pa. Super. 535 (1929); accord, other antenuptial gifts,
Shaw v. Christie, 160 S.W.2d 989 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
39. Ruehling v. Hornung, 98 Pa. Super. 535 (1929); Cohen v. Sellar, [1926] 1 K.B.
536.
40. Schultz v. Duitz, 253 Ky. 135, 69 S.W.2d 27 (1934); Shaw v. Christie, 160 S.W.2d
989 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Jacobs v. Davis, [1917] 2 KLB. 532.
41. Cal. Civ. Code § 1590 (1954) (recovery if donee breaks or mutual rescission); La.
Civ. Code Ann. art. 1740, 1897 (1952) (recovery even if donor at fault).
42. Ala. Code tit. 7, § 114 (1958); Cal. Civ. Code § 43.5(d) (1954); Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 41-3-1 (1963); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 771.01-08 (1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 75C, § 2
(1957); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 207, § 47A (1969); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.901(4)
(1968); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.380 (1967); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:11 (1955); N.J.
Rev. Stat. § 2A:23-1 (1951); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 48, §§ 171-73 (1965); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§
248.01-02(Supp. 1969); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-727 to 1-731 (1957).
43. A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1940), affd 123 Fld 1017 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 691 (1941) (gifts in contemplation of marriage). Contra, Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 390 Pa. 502, 136 A.2d 127 (1957).
44. Stienback v. Halsey, 115 Cal. App. 2d 213, 251 P.2d 1008 (Dist. CL App. 1953);
Priebe v. Sinclair, 90 Cal. App. 2d 79, 202 P.2d 577 (Dist. CL App. 1949); De Cicco v.
Barker, 339 Mass. 457, 159 N.E.2d 534 (1959); Gikas v. Nicholis, 96 N.H. 177, 71 A.2d 785
(1950); Morris v. MacNab, 25 N.J. 271, 135 A.2d 657 (1957).
45. Haviland v. Halstead, 34 N.Y. 643 (1866); Williams v. Igel, 62 Misc. 354, 116 N.YS.
778 (N.Y. City Ct. 1909); accord, Davis v. Pryor, 112 F. 274 (8th Cir. 1901).
46. Williams v. Igel, 62 Misc. 354, 356, 116 N.Y.S. 778, 779-80 (N.Y. City Ct. 1909).
47. Haviland v. Halstead, 34 N.Y. 643 (1866).
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stein v. Rosenthal48 that section 80-b does not create a new cause of action, but
does remove the bar to recovery under common law as it existed prior to the
anti-heart balm act. 49 The majority appears to be saying that although engagement rings are recoverable when the donee breaks the engagement, they are
when the contract to marry is void because it is against public
not recoverable
50
policy.
The dissent argued that regardless of the invalidity of the contract to marry,
the plaintiff in equity should recover the ring in order to prevent unjust enrichment. 51 There is authority in New York which would allow a quasi-contractual
recovery of an engagement ring in a case not involving a married participant.5
However, the majority in Lowe relied upon cases from other jurisdictions where
recovery was denied because of the doctrine of unclean hands. 3 The dissent,
pointing out that both parties have unclean hands, attempted to circumnavigate
the doctrine by arguing that although the remedies of equity should be denied
not bar recovery when recovery
one with unclean hands, unclean hands should
54
is necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.
The holding of the court assumed that the condition upon which the gift is
dependent is a breach of the contract to marry. The court reasoned that the
contract was void and therefore could not be the basis of a condition and thus
the ring must have been an absolute gift. The assumption appears erroneous.
It is the failure of the marriage to occur without any fault of the donor, and
not the breach of the contract to marry, which conditions the gift. All situations
would be encompassed by this rule and there would be no need for separate
rules when there is no breach as in the case of mutual rescission of the contract.
Furthermore, the inclusion of the problem within the sphere of the actual contract of marriage would meet the same criticisms that the Andie decision met
when it extended the anti-heart balm act to bar an action for recovery because
of the ring's connection with the contract. Treating the giving of the ring as
only contemporaneous to the contract would seem more in line with the legislative intent behind section 80-b; public policy may void contracts to marry
where one of the parties is married but public policy does not favor the apparent deception used by the donee to enrich herself. The condition attached
to the gift having arisen, i.e., the failure of the marriage to occur, the gift
should be returned.
56 Misc. 2d 311, 314, 288 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507 (Civil Ct. of City of N.Y. 1968).
49. Lowe v. Quinn, 32 App. Div. 2d 269, 270, 301 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362-63 (1st Dep't 1969).
50. Id. at 271, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
51. Id. at 272-73, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
48.

52. Zawadzki v. Vandetti, 255 App. Div. 932, 9 N.Y.S.2d 219 (4th Dep't 1938).
53. Malasarte v. Keye, 13 Alas. 407 (1951); Morgan v. Wright, 219 Ga. 385, 133 S.E.2d
341 (1963) (unclean hands by man who gave an engagement ring to a married woman);
Armitage v. Hogan, 25 Wash. 2d 672, 171 P.2d 830 (1946) (plaintiff was a married man).
54. 32 App. Div. 2d at 272-73, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 364-65.
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Evidence-Scope of Cross-Examination Not Restricted to Matters Covered
by Direct Examination.-Plaintiff sought to recover damages for loss of society
and companionship after her husband had been killed in an automobile accident.
On direct examination she testified that she and her husband had been happily
married and had enjoyed a close relationship. On cross-examination, plaintiff
was asked if she were aware of an extramarital affair her husband had with another woman. The trial court sustained plaintiff's objection to this line of
questioning as improper cross-examination beyond the scope of direct examination. The court went on to find that the husband was contributorily negligent
and denied plaintiff recovery. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed but ruled that the lower court had erred in excluding the question concerning the alleged affair since it was directly related to and in impeachment
of the plaintiff's testimony on direct examination. The court went further in
dictum, however, and ruled that the limits of cross-examination should be left to
the discretion of the trial judge, and not necessarily restricted to matters covered
by direct. Boiler v. Cofrances, 42 Wis. 2d 170, 166 N.W.2d 129 (1969).
The majority rule is that cross-examination must be restricted to those matters which were raised on the direct examination1 unless the cross-examiner
wishes to impeach the credibility of the witness.2 This rule was not derived
from the English common law or early American decisions 3 but was first adopted
by a Pennsylvania state court in lminaker v. Buckley. 4 In that case, the plaintiff proved, through the testimony of three referees, the existence and subsequent
loss of an award granted to him by the referees in a prior nuisance suit. The
defendant, before he had opened his defense, wished to examine the referees on
the subject matter of the prior suit. The court ruled that a "witness may not be
cross-examined to facts which are wholly foreign to the points in issue ... for
the purpose of contradicting him by other evidence." 5 Eventually, the rule was
unequivocally approved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Philadelphia & Trenton R-R. v. Stimnpson,6 where certain statements were held to
be inadmissible "upon the broader principle, now well established, although
sometimes lost sight of in our loose practice at trials, that a party has no right
to cross-examine any witness except as to facts and circumstances connected
with the matters stated in his direct examination. ' 7 On the strength of these two
leading cases the majority of the states began to follow this restrictive rule of
1. Houghton v. Jones, 68 US. (1 Wall.) 702 (1863). See also People v. Watson, 46 Cal.
2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956), cert. denied, 355 US. 846 (1957); Bunselmeyer v. Hill, 179
Neb. 140, 137 N.V.2d 354 (1965). This is the New York law as well. See Hall v. Allemonnia
Fire Ins. Co., 175 App. Div. 289, 161 N.Y.S. 1091 (4th Dep't 1916).
2. Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1963); Mendez v. Dorman, 151 Conn,
193, 195 A.2d 561 (1963); State v. Musack, 254 Iowa 104, 116 N.W.2d 523 (1962).
3. Fulton Bank v. Stafford, 2 Wend. 483, 485 (N.Y. 1829).
4. 16 S. & R. 71 (Pa. 1827).

5. Id. at 77.
6. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 448 (1840).
7. Id. at 460.
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evidence,8 more commonly referred to as the American rule.0 The most logical
and practical explanation for the rule is that it serves to promote order and
regularity in a trial proceeding where each side separately presents and develops
his own case. In other words "a plaintiff's witness should not be expected to
help make the defendant's case on cross-examination." 10
The American rule displays a wide degree of flexibility in application. In a
great number of cases the courts have not hesitated to extend the limits of crossexamination by exercising a sound discretion where the situation warrants it."
In a recent typical case, People v. Swingle,12 the defendant's wife on direct examination testified that her husband was a good provider for his family, as
evidence of his good character. The court held it proper for the district attorney
on cross-examination to question the witness in regard to an assault committed
by the defendant against his wife, even though it had not been referred to on
direct examination: "The manner and extent of the cross-examination lies largely
within the discretion of the Trial Judge and, although there may be room for a
difference of opinion as to the scope and extent of cross-examination, in the
absence of 'plain abuse and injustice,' such discretion should not be disturbed.""' ,
Since trial courts have broad discretionary powers over the mode of conducting
trials and the order of introducing the evidence,1 4 any deviation or relaxation
of the American rule will rarely be reversed unless there was a clear abuse of
15 or unless the deviation worked a serious injury to the adverse
discretion
16
party.
In practice the American rule is rarely given a narrow or technical interpretation.17 Cross-examination may encompass the general subject matter inquired
into on direct.' 8 It may include questions relating not only to all the facts
elicited on direct, but also all facts connected therewith' 0 or any parts of a
general or continuous subject which was mentioned on direct. 20 Cross-examina8. For a complete sketch of the development of the rule in various jurisdictions over the

19th and 20th centuries, see 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) § 1890, at 548 (1940 & Supp.
1964) [hereinafter cited as Wigmorel.
9. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 393 (1957).
10. Boiler v. Cofrances, 42 Wis. 2d 170, 181, 166 N.W.2d 129, 134. Wigmore lists five
reasons for the rule in § 1887, at 537-39.
11. See cases cited in C. McCormick, Evidence § 24, at 47 nn.5 & 6 (1954) (hereinafter
cited as McCormick]. McCormick is careful to point out, however, that some courts still
apply the scope of the direct test as a strict standard and appellate courts, though often
giving lip service to discretion, reverse a large number of cases in application of the test.
Id. § 24, at 47.
12. 28 App. Div. 2d 1063, 284 N.Y.S.2d 133 (3d Dep't 1967) (mem.).
13. Id. at 1064, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (citation omitted).
14. Wills v. Russell, 100 U.S. 621, 626 (1879).
15. Abel of Arkansas, Inc. v. Richards, 263 Ark. 281, 365 S.W.2d 705 (1963).
16. 100 U.S. at 626.
17. Marut v. Costello, 34 Ill. 2d 125, 214 N.E.2d 768 (1965).
18. Butler v. New York Central R.R., 253 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1958); State Roads Comm.
v. Wyvill, 244 Md. 163, 223 A.2d 146 (1966).
19. State v. Cams, 136 Mont. 126, 345 P.2d 735 (1959).
20. Kaminski v. Meadows, 264 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1959).
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tion has also been extended to include questions which would explain, contradict,
or discredit 2 ' any deductions or conclusions 22 formulated from the direct testimony. Similarly, where the direct examination creates an inference as to the
existence of a fact not directly testified to, a witness may be cross-examined to
rebut such an inference. 23 Other courts have relied on a "reasonable theory,"
that is, anything reasonably within the scope of direct would be proper on
24
cross-examination.
In other jurisdictions adhering to the American rule, the scope of cross-examination has been extended, where the witness is a party to the action, to
include all matters pertinent to the case regardless of whether they were touched
upon on direct examination.25 In other cases the courts have exercised their
discretion more liberally where parties themselves are testifying.20 This is
especially true where the direct testimony is evasive or indefinite or where alleged fraudulent transactions are involved.2 7 Generally, however, the rule still
prevails that cross-examination must be confined to the subject matter covered
28
in direct regardless of who is testifying.
29
The English rule, followed in a minority of jurisdictions, 0 permits crossexamination to extend to all relevant matters in the proceeding even though
they were not raised on direct.3l This "wide open" practice enables a crossexaminer to introduce his case and offer grounds of defense before his opponent
21. Laffoon v. Kantor, 373 P.2d 252 (Okla. 1962).

22. Parente v. Dickenson, 391 Pa. 162, 137 A.2d 788 (1958).
23. Wheatly v. Heideman, 251 Iowa 695, 102 N.W.2d 343 (1960). See also Crawford v.
Nilan, 264 App. Div. 46, 35 N.Y.S.2d 33 (3d Dep't 1942), rev'd 289 N.Y. 444, 46 N'.E.2d
512 (1943).
24. State v. King, 37 N.J. 285, 181 A2d 158 (1962); State v. Kozukonis, 100 R.I. 298,
214 A.2d 893 (1965).
25. Geelan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 400 Pa. 240, 161 A2d 595 (1960); Morse v. Morse, 126
Vt. 290, 229 A2d 228 (1967). Before Wisconsin adopted the wide open rule for witnesses
in general, it had adopted the wide open rule where parties are cross-examined. See Abbot
v. Truck Ins. Exch. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 671, 148 N.Wi2d 116 (1967).
26. Decker v. Everson, 14 N.J. Misc. 860, 187 A. 783 (Sup. Ct. 1937); People v. Ramistella, 306 N.Y. 379, 118 N.E.2d 566 (1954).
27. Zuber v. Northern Pac. Ry., 246 Minn. 157, 74 N.W.2d 641 (1956).
28. E.g., Sima v. Skaggs Payless Drug Center, Inc., 82 Idaho 387, 353 Pid 1085 (1960);
Davis v. Kansas Elec. Power Co., 159 Kan. 97, 152 P2d 806 (1944); Davis v. Lenhoff, 74
S.D. 190, 50 N.Wi2d 213 (1951). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(b).
29. The only precedent in England for the restrictive American practice was in the
Chancery Court. The common law practice in England was dearly to the contrary. See
generally Wigmore § 1885, at 533-34.
30. The minority rule is now more or less followed in 14 states: Alabama, Arizona,
Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, AMissippi, Missouri, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Wisconsin.
31. Moody v. Rowell, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 490 (1835) (leading case). See also Coward
v. McKinney, 277 Ala. 513, 172 So. 2d 538 (1965) ; Rush v. State, 254 iss. 641, 182 So. 2d
214 (1966). Naturally cross-examination is similarly extended if the witness happens to be
one of the litigants in the action. See Jones v. Terminal R.1L Ass'n, 363 Mo. 1210, 258
S.W.2d 643 (1953).
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has finished presenting his side.3 2 In effect, this system of cross-examination
empowers counsel to extract all of the damaging facts from the witness immediately after the witness has testified for his opponent, without any regard to
the scope of direct-as long as his questions are not immaterial or collateral
to the issues.3 3 This is in contrast to the American rule, where the cross-examiner
must make the witness his own if he wishes to ask pertinent questions not
covered on direct,3 4 thereby losing the power to discredit 5 the witness and to
ask him leading questions. 36
Undoubtedly, the liberal English rule is the better reasoned and more sensible
practice. Both Wigmore and McCormick stress the importance of cross-examination as a vehicle for getting at the truth and that such an examination should
not be hampered by any restrictive measures which produce only confusion,
delays and continual bickering over what is within the scope of direct.0 7 It is
obvious from the number of cases that courts have had more trouble interpreting and applying the restrictive American rule than the relatively simple
English rule.
In practice, the American rule has undergone a gradual but steady erosion
by the implementation of the trial court's discretion in extending the scope of
cross-examination. 38 With this background, the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence has adopted the American rule, but it permits, in the judge's discretion,
inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. 0 The Advisory
Committee noted that the American rule had merit in that a "limited crossexamination promotes orderly presentation of the case."' 40 However, the Committee also recognized that the rule of limited cross-examination is within the
32.

Willoughby v. Northwestern Ry., 32 S.C. 410, 11 S.E. 339 (1890). Missouri has a

statute which recognizes the full scope of cross-examination but prevents a cross-examiner
from questioning the witness in regard to a counterclaim or setoff until he has made the

witness his own. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 491.070 (1952). In Arizona, a defense established on
cross-examination is admissible but the questions must be within the scope of direct. See
Podol v. Jacobs, 65 Ariz. 50, 173 P.2d 758 (1946).
33. Bass v. Bass, 222 Ga. 378, 149 S.E.2d 818 (1966); Monts v. State, 214 Tenn. 171,
379 S.W.2d 34 (1964).
34. Houghton v. Jones, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 702, 706 (1863).
35. Pollard v. State, 201 Ind. 180, 166 N.E. 654 (1929). But this rule has been liberalized
in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4514: "In addition to impeachment in the
manner permitted by common law, any party may introduce proof that any witness has
made a prior statement inconsistent with his testimony if the statement was made in a
writing subscribed by him or was made under oath."
36. People v. Court of Oyer & Terminer, 83 N.Y. 436, 459 (1881).
37. McCormick § 27, at 51; Wigmore §§ 1885-90, at 532-60.
38. Supra note 11.
39. Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts & Magistrates, Rule 6-11(b)
at 130. (Preliminary Draft 1969): "Scope of Cross-Examination: Cross-examination should
be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The judge may in the exercise of discretion permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination."
40. Id. at 132.

1969]

CASE NOTES

judge's general control over the manner and order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence, and therefore, appellate courts need not become involved
in the issue.41 Perhaps the strongest indication of the wide freedom accorded
to the judge under the new proposed rule is contained in the committee's comment that "the rule is phrased in terms of a suggestion rather than a mandate
42
to the trial judge."
By and large, states have not deemed it necessary to move away from the
restrictive rule and to adopt a more liberal rule.43 The only states to adopt
the English rule had previously followed a modified form of the American rule
where the cross-examiner could question the witness about any relevant facts in
the action except those facts relating to his own affirmative case. 4 Instead, the
trend in recent years has been toward a discretionary liberalization of the American rule.45 The proposed Federal Rules, in recognition of this development,
encourage full use of the judge's discretion to eliminate some of the unfairness
which may result from a strict application of the American rule.4"

Torts-Libel--Privilege of Fair and True Report of Judicial Proceedings
Held Inapplicable to Litigant Who Had Persuaded His Corporation to
Commence Suit Based on Allegedly False Allegations and Circulated
Copies of the Summons and Complaint Among Members of the Trade.Plaintiff and defendant were brothers and principals of the Universal Oven
Corporation. After the plaintiff had terminated his employment with the
corporation, the defendant persuaded Universal to commence an action charging that the plaintiff had conspired to misappropriate the corporation's trade
secrets and assets. The defendant then circulated printed copies of the summons and complaint, together with a covering letter signed by Universal's
chairman of the board, among members of the trade.' Plaintiff subsequently
41. Id.
42. Id. (emphasis added).

43. Supra note 8.
44. Michigan and Arizona were the leading states following this practice and now have
adopted the English rule although the Michigan cases are not quite dear. McCormick § 21,
at 45 n.14. "Ohio seems to be the principal, if not the only, present-day stronghold of this
practice." Id. § 21, at 45 n.13.
45. Supra note 11.
46. Supra note 39.
1. The covering letter stated: "We enclose for your information a copy of the summons
and complaint on file in the office of the Clerk of The County of New York in our suit
against former employees and consultants of the Universal Oven Company." Williams v.
W lliams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 595, 246 N.E.2d 333, 335, 298 N.Y.S.2d 473, 476 (1969). Defendants alleged that their purpose was to put the industry on notice that they could be
held liable to Universal for damages for loss of profits should they deal with the plaintiff
regarding these matters. However, this could only be accomplished if other members of
the trade were chargeable with knowledge that the plaintiff was misusing its trade secrets
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commenced an action charging that the defendant's allegations in the conspiracy suit were false and that his conduct in circulating the summons and
complaint among members of the trade amounted to abuse of process and
libel. Defendant alleged that plaintiff had failed to set forth a cause of action
for abuse of process, and furthermore that section 74 of the New York Civil
Rights Law provided a complete defense to "any person" who published a fair
and true report of a judicial proceeding. 2 The trial court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss, 3 and on appeal the appellate division affirmed by stating
that the complaint sufficiently pleaded misuse of legal process and libel. 4 However, its decision was modified by the New York Court of Appeals which held
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for either abuse of process
or malicious prosecution, since the gravamen of these actions entailed interference with person or property which was not alleged by the plaintiff.0
Nevertheless, the court held that a cause of action for libel had been stated
since "it was never the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 74
to allow 'any person' to maliciously institute a judicial proceeding alleging
false and defamatory charges, and to then circulate a press release or other
communication based thereon and escape liability by invoking the statute."0
Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 246 N.E.2d 333, 298 N.Y.S.2d 473
(1969).

On the theory that the interests of society and justice require complete
freedom of expression without regard to motive whenever men seek redress
from the courts, it is universally held that statements by participants," if
and violating his contract. Id. at 606 n.2, 246 N.E.2d at 341 n.2, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85
n.2. See, e.g., Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., Inc., 230 F.2d 855, 864-65 (4th Cir.
1956).
2. "A civil action cannot be maintained against any person, firm or corporation, for the
publication of a fair and true report of any judicial proceeding, legislative proceeding or
other official proceeding, or for any heading of the report which is a fair and true headnote of the statement published.
This section does not apply to a libel contained in any other matter added by any
person concerned in the publication; or in the report of anything said or done at the
time and place of such a proceeding which was not a part thereof." N.Y. Civ. Rights
Law § 74 (Supp. 1969).
3. The New York Supreme Court stated that the complaint was sufficient to state a
cause of action, and that the defendant had not submitted sufficient "documentary evidence"
to sustain a defense under section 74 of the Civil Rights Law. The court further noted
that, as a matter of law, it could not be stated that the publications complained of constituted a "fair" report of a judicial proceeding. Privilege in this matter was a defense to
be pleaded and proven. Williams v. Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 1016, 268 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup.
Ct. 1966).
4. Williams v. Williams, 27 App. Div. 2d 550, 275 N.Y.S.2d 425 (2d Dep't 1966) (mem.).
5. 23 N.Y.2d at 599, 246 N.E.2d at 335, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 479. But see notes 41-42 infra.
6. Id. at 599, 246 N.E.2d at 337, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
7. Participants have been defined to include the judge, grand and petit jurors, witnesses

1969]

CASE NOTES

.

371

relevant to the issues and made during the course of judicial proceedings, are
absolutely privileged.8 It is equally well established that there exists a qualified privilege of fair comment in reporting judicial proceedings. 9 However,
not all jurisdictions agree as to what exactly is encompassed by judicial proceedings. The vast majority follow the leading Massachusetts case of Cowley
v. Pulsifer10 and hold that the privilege to report court proceedings does not
extend to papers already filed by a party, but which have not been brought
before a magistrate for official action. 1 Nevertheless, New York and a minority
of other jurisdictions hold that the mere filing of pleadings is an official act
and a matter of public record, thereby including such documents within the
privileged scope of a fair and true report of judicial proceedings. 12
Prior to 1854, the common law of England with regard to the privilege of
fair and accurate comment was in effect in New York. Thus, a report was
privileged if it were a fair report of a trial or legislative proceeding made in
good faith without malice. 13 In 1854, the first New York statute on the
(whether voluntary or involuntary), counsels, and the parties themselves. See W. Prosser,
Torts § 109, at 796-98 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as W. Prosser].
8. An absolute privilege insulates the author and publisher from liability for an otherwise
defamatory communication, regardless of their motives. See id. § 109, at 796; cf. Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). In Great Britain, the statements of the participants are absolutely privileged, regardless of the relevancy to the issue involved. In the majority of
jurisdictions in the United States, however, the privilege is limited to the extent that the
statement must be in some way relevant to the issues involved in the case. See W. Prosser
§ 109, at 798-99; 1 E. Seelman, The Law of Libel and Slander in the State of Ne - York
f1 191, at 233 (rev. ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as 1 E. Seelman].
9. A qualified privilege confers immunity upon the author or publisher, "conditioned
upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose." W. Prosser § 110, at
805. "Since it obviously is to the interest of the public that information be made available
as to what takes place in public affairs, a qualified privilege is recognized under which a
newspaper or anyone else may make such a report to the public. The privilege rests upon
the idea that any member of the public, if he were present, might see and hear for himself, so that the reporter is merely a substitute for the public eye-this, together with
the obvious public interest in having public affairs made known to all." Id. § 110, at 816
(footnotes omitted); see 53 C.JS. Libel & Slander § 127 (1948).
10. 137 Mass. 392 (1884).
11. See W. Prosser § 110, at 818.
12. The leading New York case is Campbell v. New York Evening Post, Inc., 245 N.Y.
320, 157 N.E. 153 (1927). The other jurisdictions that follow the New York rule are
California, Kentucky, South Carolina, and Tennessee. See W. Prosser § 110, at 818. A
federal court interpreting Illinois law in American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Brink's, Inc.,
380 F2d 131 (7th Cir. 1967), held that Illinois followed the New York rule, but the
courts of that state have never decided a case exactly on point. The federal court relied
on dictum in Lorillard v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 65 Ill. App. 2d 65, 73-74, 213 N.E2d 1, S
(1965) which stated that once a suit is filed, the privilege of fair comment attaches.
13. 1 E. Seelman 111209-10.
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subject provided that "[n]o reporter, editor or proprietor of any newspaper
shall be liable to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, for a fair and
true report in such newspaper of any judicial, legislative, or other public
official proceedings, of any statement, speech, argument or debate in the
course of the same, except upon actual proof of malice in making such report, which shall in no case be implied from the fact of the publication."' 14 The
statute was subsequently upheld in Salisbury v. Union & Advertiser Co.,'6
where the court held that the publication of a fair and true report of any
judicial proceedings, without malice, was privileged. Thus, the statute was
construed as a codification of the prior English common law and was held not
to enlarge the privilege. 16 In 1930, the legislature significantly amended the
law by deleting the provision that malice could defeat the privilege. 17 Finally,
in 1940 an amendment was passed extending the privilege of fair comment to
"any person, firm or corporation.' 8
Notwithstanding the fact that the 1930 amendment specifically deleted the
exception that malice could destroy the privilege, and that the 1940 amendment enlarged the privilege to include "any person, firm or corporation,"'"
the New York courts have consistently refused to apply the law where manifest injustice would result. That the courts would refuse to read malice out
20
of the statute was clearly demonstrated in 1937 in Oglesby v. Cranwell,
14. Law of April 1, 1854, ch. 130, § 1, [18541 Laws of N.Y. 314 (repealed 1880).
The second section provided that the privilege did not extend to "libelous comments or
remarks super-added to and interspersed or connected with such report." Id. § 2.
15.

9 N.Y. St. Rep. 465 (Sup. Ct. 1887).
16. 1 E. Seelman ff 211, at 264. However, the English common law rule that ex parte
applications were not judicial proceedings was overturned in 1874. Ackerman v. Jones,
37 N.Y. Super. 42 (Super. Ct. 1874).
17. The amendment also extended the privilege to any headnote of the report which is
"a fair and true headnote of the Article Published." Law of Sept. 1, 1930, ch. 619, § 1,
[1930] Laws of N.Y. 1127 (amended 1940).
18. Law of April 17, 1940, ch. 561, § 5, [1940] Laws of N.Y. 1496 (amended 1956).
The judiciary committee of the assembly in reporting this bill stated: "This amendment
confers upon all persons the same privilege now accorded to newspapers and radio broadcasters by sections 337 and 337-a of the civil practice act, which privilege, by decision of
the court of appeals is accorded to all persons (see Lewis v. The Chemical Foundation
Inc., et al., 262 N.Y. 489 (1933); Seelman, Libel and Slander in the state of New York, Sec.
213.)." 1 N.Y. Assembly J. 1022 (1940) (emphasis deleted). The law was again amended
in 1956 by striking out the word "proceedings" after "judicial" and "legislative", as well
as other minor changes. Law of April 20, 1956, ch. 891, § 1, [1956] Laws of N.Y. 1914,
now N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 74 (Supp. 1969). See note 2 supra.
19. See Kelley v. Hearst Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 480, 157 N.Y.S.2d 498 (3d Dep't 1956);
Stevenson v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 614, 96 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't), aff'd 302
N.Y. 81, 96 N.E.2d 187 (1950); Jacobs v. Herlands, 51 Misc. 907, 17 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd mem., 259 App. Div. 823, 19 N.Y.S.2d 770 (2d Dep't 1940).
20. 250 App. Div. 720, 293 N.Y.S. 67 (2d Dep't 1937).
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where the court sustained a plea by the defendant that the alleged defamation
was a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding which was published without
actual mdice. In speaking of Oglesby the appellate division in Williams stated:
"[W]e held that this defense was sufficient as a matter of pleading, primarily
because of the allegation that the publication was in good faith and without
malice."21 In Seltzer v. Fields,22 involving a previous action for dissolution of
a partnership, plaintiff alleged that defendant caused the complaint in the
prior action to be "'left indiscriminately in mailboxes, shoved under doors
and otherwise broadcast for the purpose of publication, but not for the prosecution of the action.' "23 Although the court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss,2 4 it noted that the plaintiff might be able to "allege and prove a
cause or causes of action based upon some unconnected publications."2 5 Thus,
the court was in effect inviting the plaintiff to show that the publication was
not made in furtherance of the public interest, but solely to injure the plaintiff, i.e., with malice.
Judge Jasen, writing for the majority in Williams,2 summarily dismissed
the cause of action for abuse of process, stating that "there must be an unlawful interference with one's person or property under color of process in order
that action for abuse of process may lie. '"7 The court then addressed itself
to the principal issue raised by the plaintiff, i.e., section 74 of the Civil Rights
Law as a defense to the ex parte publication of defamatory material by a
party-litigant. In holding that section 74 is no defense to malicious publication of defamatory pleadings in such a situation, Judge Jasen relied heavily
upon judicial interpretation of legislative intent. He noted that the reason
for the privilege lies in the "'public interest in having proceedings of courts
of justice public, not secret, for the greater security thus given the proper
administration of justice."' 28 Having thus established as his major premise
that the public interest is the primary reason for the privilege, and noting the
purposes of the 1930 and 1940 amendments,29 Judge Jasen then methodically
21. 27 App. Div. 2d at 551, 275 N.YS.2d at 427 (emphasis added).
22. 20 App. Div. 2d 60, 244 N.YS.2d 792 (1st Dep't 1963), affd, 14 N.Y.2d 624, 198
N.E.2d 368, 249 N.YS.2d 174 (1964).
23. Id. at 64, 244 N.YS.2d at 797.
24. Id. at 60, 244 N.YS.2d at 794.
25. Id. at 64, 244 N.YS.2d at 797.
26. Judge Jasen noted at the outset that, since this was a motion to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211 (1963), plaintiff's allegations were presumed to be
true. 23 N.Y.2d at 595-96, 246 N.E.2d at 335, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
27. Id. at 596, 246 N.E.2d at 335, 298 N.YS.2d at 476-77. He dismissed malicious prosecution for the same reason, citing Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 73 N.E. 495 (1905), appeal
dismissed, 203 U.S. 129 (1906). Id. at 596 n.2, 246 N.E.2d at 335 n.2, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 477 n.2.
But see note 41 infra.
28. 23 N.Y.2d at 597, 246 N.E.2d at 336, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 477. Judge Jasen quoted
from an earlier case, Lee v. Brooklyn Union Pub. Co., 209 N.Y. 245, 248, 103 N.E. 155,

156 (1913).
29. Judge Jasen noted: "The apparent reason for removing the malice limitation was
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moved to the conclusion that the legislature could not possibly have intended
the privilege to be applicable to these circumstances. 0
Judge Burke, in his concurring opinion, agreed that the term "any person"
in the statute could not be literally construed to include the defendant, but
arrived at this conclusion by a different interpretation of the legislative history
of section 74 of the Civil Rights Law. After noting that as early as 1850 it
had been held beyond doubt in New York that a party in a judicial proceeding possessed an absolute privilege,' he turned to a discussion of the prior
statute and its subsequent amendments8 2 Judge Burke argued that the legislature by the 1940 amendment did not intend "to expand the rights of the
litigants to the point where they could both commence a suit with impunity
and then publish a true and fair report of that suit-albeit with actual
to afford the news media a greater freedom to publish news of public interest without
fear of suit." 23 N.Y.2d at 597, 246 N.E.2d at 336, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 478. He cited the
New York Assembly Journal which had cited Lewis v. Chemical Foundation, Inc. and
E. Seelman; see note 18 supra. However, he then proceeded to discuss only Lewis,
making no further mention of Seelman. It may be interesting to note, as Chief Judge
Fuld pointed out in his dissent, that Judge Jasen cited Lewis as standing for the proposition
that the judiciary has never read malice out of the statute when, in fact, the court of
appeals in that case was ruling on a cause of action which had accrued prior to the
1930 amendment deleting the malice exception. See 23 N.Y.2d at 605, 246 N.E.2d at 341,
298 N.Y.S.2d at 484 (Fuld, C. J., dissenting in part) ; see note 36 infra.
30. "The purpose of section 74 . . . is the protection of reports of judicial proceedings
which are made in the public interest. In light of this purpose, it is impossible to conceive of the Legislature's intending to protect the defendant's perversion of judicial proceedings. It would be contrary to reason to say that the Legislature considered it necessary
to protect such defamation in order to implement the salutary aims of the statute."
23 N.Y.2d at 599, 246 N.E.2d at 337, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
31. The statements however, must have been in some way relevant to the Issues involved. See note 8 supra.
32. Judge Burke noted that even prior to the 1940 amendment, there was serious doubt
as to whether the privilege of publishing a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding
was limited to newspapers. Citing Stuart v. Press Pub. Co., 83 App. Div. 467, 82 N.Y.S.
401 (1st Dep't 1903), and Robinson v. Battle, 148 App. Div. 230, 133 N.Y.S. 57 (1st Dep't
1911) (both cases cited by E. Seelman, supra note 18), he argued that publication of a
fair and accurate report was a right enjoyed equally by all. 23 N.Y.2d at 601-02, 246 N.E.2d
at 339, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 481-82. In Stuart, it was held that the plaintiff had a cause of
action in libel when a newspaper printed reports of a divorce proceeding. Along with the
complaint it printed colorful editorial comments which were in no way contained In the
judicial proceeding. The court said that in this regard the press had no greater privilege
than any individual. In Robinson, the defendant-attorney was charged with libel for composing a newspaper article involving a previous matrimonial action in which he had represented the plaintiff's wife. Defendant argued that the statement was a fair and true report
of a judicial proceeding. The court, after reviewing the facts of the previous action, agreed
and sustained the defense. These cases, although distinguishable from Williams since they
involved newspaper publications, mildly supported Judge Burke's contention that the public
also enjoyed the privilege prior to the 1940 amendment.
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malice-and escape liability. . . . The purpose . . . was to extend to all
disinterested persons the privilege then possessed by the press-to publish
true and fair reports of judicial proceedings without fear of liability.3'a3 Thus,
anyone interested in the litigation, i.e., a party to the action, who circulated
a complaint under these circumstances, was precluded from seeking asylum
under the confines of section 74.
Chief Judge Fuld, in a vigorous partial dissent, argued that the plaintiff's
cause of action in libel was without merit and should be dismissed in its entirety.34 He pointed out that the statute "contains no exception or qualification, either express or implied, for persons who initiated or were parties to
the judicial proceeding, and no such exception or qualification is indicated in
the legislative history."3 5 Arguing for a literal application of the statute, the
Chief Judge indicated that the court in the past had literally interpreted "all
persons" to include all parties, whether interested in the proceeding or not.-,
He was unconcerned that under his interpretation an "occasional libel [may]
33. 23 N.Y.2d at 603, 246 N.E.2d at 339, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 482 (emphasis added). Judge
Burke arrived at this conclusion by the somewhat tenuous proposition that since the legislative bill jacket accompanying the 1940 amendment quoted a paragraph in E. Seelman
(U 213) to the effect that all persons should have the privilege then afforded to newspapers,
the legislators were obviously aware of a previous paragraph in E. Seelman (9 191)
affording participants absolute privilege in judicial proceedings. Judge Burke then reasoned
that the crucial question was whether the amendment enlarged the rights of the participant,
or merely those of the reporter who published a fair and true report. Since the participant
was already absolutely privileged as to utterances in a judicial proceeding, Judge Burke
concluded that the legislature could not have intended to enlarge the participant's privilege,
but only that of the disinterested publisher. Id. at 601-04, 246 N.E.2d at 339-40, 298
N.Y.S.2d at 481-83.
34. Id. at 605, 246 N.E2d at 341, 298 N.YS.2d at 484.
35. Id. at 606, 246 N.E.2d at 341, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
36. In Lewis v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 262 N.Y. 489, 188 N.E. 33 (1933), where
defendant had privately circulated 200,000 copies of an alleged defamatory deposition made
in an earlier proceeding, the Chief Judge pointed out that the defense of fair report of
judicial proceeding was sustained despite the fact that one of the defendants was a party
to the earlier proceeding. However, this case is distinguishable from Williams, since defendants in Lewis circulated copies of a newspaper story and not the complaint itself. Chief
Judge Fuld also cited Robinson v. Battle, 148 App. Div. 230, 133 N.Y.S. 57 (Ist Dep't
1911), and Oglesby v. Cranwell, 250 App. Div. 720, 293 N.Y.S. 67 (2d Dep't 1937) as
authority for the proposition that the court in the past has held that any person, even
one interested in the proceedings, was protected by the privilege. See 23 N.Y.2d at 603,
246 N.E.2d at 342, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 486. Lewis, however, was cited by the majority as
authority that malice can defeat the privilege. See note 29 supra. In addition, Robinson
was cited by the concurring opinion as authority that even prior to 1940 the privilege of
fair report was not confined to newspapers. See note 32 supra. While the Chief Judge is
correct in his interpretation of Robinson and Oglesby, the courts in these cases sustained the
defense principally because of the absence of any malice on the part of the defendants, and
not because they fell within the technical meaning of the statute.
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'a

go uncompensated,1'
since the interest of society "'must prevail over the
incidential harm to the individual. ' ,,38
The dissent, however, failed to find the plaintiff remediless in such a
situation. Noting that section 74 extends its privilege only to the publication
of a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding, and not to the commencement of that proceeding, the Chief Judge thought that an action in malicious
prosecution was appropriate. 9 He stated that the protected publication "is
an act entirely separate and distinct from that (earlier committed) of maliciously initiating a false and baseless lawsuit. Since the commencement of
such a suit, wholly apart from any subsequent publication relating to it, is
itself a cognizable and actionable tort, neither reason nor logic would prevent the plaintiff from seeking damages for malicious prosecution if he were
ultimately to prevail in the original conspiracy litigation. '40 Nor was he in
sympathy with the majority that such an action must be barred because of
lack of interference with the plaintiff's person or property. 41 Notwithstanding
language to the contrary in the lower New York courts, he argued, the court
of appeals has never stated that interference with person or property was
42
a necessary element of malicious prosecution based upon a prior civil action.
37. 23 N.Y.2d at 608, 246 N.E.2d at 343, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 609, 246 N.E.2d at 343, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 487-88.
40. Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 609, 246 N.E.2d at 343, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 488. There is a wide divergence of
opinion in American jurisdictions in regard to the propriety of allowing an action for
malicious prosecution based upon a prior civil action maliciously instituted without probable
cause. A distinct minority of American courts continue to follow the English rule that
malicious prosecution will lie only if based upon a prior criminal action. Of those jurisdictions that do allow a cause of action for malicious prosecution to arise out of a civil suit,
the numerical majority do not require interference with person or property. An important
minority, however, including New York, hold that interference with person or property
is a necessary element of the tort. See W. Prosser § 114, at 871-73; Annot., 150 A.L.R. 897
(1944) ; 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 12 (Supp. 1969). Nevertheless, the Chief Judge,
citing Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 73 N.E. 495 (1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 129 (1906),
and Munoz v. City of New York, 18 N.Y.2d 6, 218 N.E.2d 527, 271 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1966),
argued that the court of appeals has previously defined malicious prosecution as "one that is
begun in malice, without probable cause to believe it can succeed, and which finally ends in
failure." 181 N.Y. at 5, 73 N.E. at 496. Both Chief Judge Fuld and Judge Jasen cited Burt
as authority for their conflicting views on malicious prosecution. Sec note 27 supra. Judge
Jasen merely cited the case without comment, but the Chief Judge argued that Burt specifically allowed a cause of action for malicious prosecution to be maintained without Interference with person or property, although recovery might be nominal. "Damages are rarely
recovered, however, for the malicious prosecution of a civil action, unless person or
property is interfered with. .

..

"1Id.

42. There are several cases in the lower New York courts holding that Interference
with person or property is a necessary element of malicious prosecution based upon a civil
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Therefore, he concluded, malicious prosecution is not only 43not barred, but is
the correct and proper remedy under these circumstances.
In the light of past decisions, however, it is not surprising that the court
of appeals in Williams has affirmed that the plaintiff has stated a cause of
action in libel. By its long justification of its holding in relation to section 74
of the Civil Rights Law, the court tacitly admitted that it holds a different
standard than that of the statute: "We will not blindly apply the words
of a statute to arrive at an unreasonable or absurd result."4 4 It is interesting
to note that a federal district court, in interpreting New York Law in Phillips
v. Murchison, 45 held that the mailing of a complaint by the defendant directly to named individuals fell within the privilege of section 74 of the
Civil Rights Law and dismissed the cause of action.40 The federal court of
appeals, however, after Williams had been decided in the appellate division,
reversed the lower court on that issue by noting: "The case [Williams] is also
important here because it draws the distinction, a distinction not apparent on
the face of the New York Civil Rights Law . . . § 74, between, on the one
hand, a litigant's publication of a complaint to news media . . . and, on the
other, his direct publication of a complaint to private individuals." 4 7 Perhaps
New York is moving closer to the sole purpose test of the Restatement of
Torts. 48 According to the Restatement, any publication of a judicial proceeding is privileged if it is a fair and accurate report and is not made
solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed.40 Given its
action. See 36 N.Y. Jur. Malicious Prosecution § 10 (1964). Chief Judge Fuld may be
correct in his statement that the court of appeals has never definitively spoken upon the
question, but in Metromedia, Inc. v. Mandel, 21 App. Div. 2d 219, 249 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Ist
Dep't), aff'd mem., 15 N.Y.2d 616, 203 N.E.2d 914, 255 N.YS.2d 660 (1964), the court
unanimously affirmed without opinion the appellate division ruling which contained the
following language: "If there was wrong in the issuance of the process and malicious interference with the property of the plaintiff so as to constitute malicious prosecution ...
[t]he pleading would have to claim interference with person or property in connection with
the bringing of the civil action, or by injunction, attachment, arrest or other provisional
remedy." 21 App. Div. 2d at 223, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (citations omitted).
43. 23 N.Y.2d at 610, 246 N.E.2d at 344, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
44. Id. at 599, 246 N.E.2d at 337, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
45. 252 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), modified, 383 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 958 (1968).
46. 252 F. Supp. at 523.
47. 383 F.2d at 372.
48. Restatement of Torts § 611 (1938): "The publication of a report of judicial proceedings, or proceedings of a legislative or administrative body or an executive officer of
the United States, a State or Territory thereof, or a municipal corporation or of a body
empowered by law to perform a public duty is privileged, although it contains matter
which is false and defamatory, if it is (a) accurate and complete or a fair abridgement
of such proceedings, and (b) not made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the
person defamed."
49. Id.

378

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

most narrow construction, Williams states a cause of action in libel when a
complaint is circulated maliciously to named individuals by a party-litigant, the
sole purpose of the publication being to ruin the good name and reputation of the
person defamed. Whether the court will broaden this to include malicious publication of a complaint to the news media when the sole purpose is to defame, and
not to prosecute a suit, remains at present an open question.

